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This thesis examines FBI terrorism and homeland security information sharing with state, 
local and tribal homeland security agencies mandated by Presidents Bush and Obama, 
and the U.S. Congress.  The thesis compares this “status quo” with three new proposed 
approaches that use technology and modify the FBI “routine use” exceptions to the 
Privacy Act to improve overall FBI information sharing.  The thesis rates the following 
approaches:  (1) “status quo,” (2) new homeland security “routine use” exception, (3) 
Discoverability of Information and (4) XML Segregation of Information.  All four 
options are analyzed using a two-phase analysis to determine their effectiveness and 
likelihood of successful implementation.  The effectiveness is evaluated by judging the 
information shared, the privacy protected and the security of each approach.  The 
likelihood of successful implementation is evaluated by judging the impact of FBI 
cultural resistance, fiscal performance, utilization of technology and training 
requirements.  This thesis proposes the implementation of all three proposed approaches 
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The 9/11 attacks required extensive reviews of the failures that contributed to this 
successful surprise attack inside the United States by Al Qaeda.  Two major commissions 
concluded that information sharing is crucial for preventing another terrorist attack and 
protecting the United States.  This view is also widely held by not only the president, but 
also most others in the national command structure of the U.S. government.  The FBI 
responded to these mandates with numerous “ad hoc” approaches to enhance sharing of 
FBI terrorism and homeland security information.  These ad hoc approaches created a 
“status quo” within the FBI that relies on numerous manual methods of information sharing 
with federal, state, local and tribal agencies.  One of the primary limitations of this 
information sharing is the limitation on sharing personally identifiable information (PII) 
imposed on federal agencies by the Privacy Act of 1974.  The FBI could expand terrorism 
and homeland security information sharing with other agencies by creating a new “routine 
use” exception, which permits the FBI to share PII for certain, published “routine uses.” 
The FBI information sharing “status quo” is a dramatic improvement over the 
extremely limited information sharing efforts prior to 9/11.  The legal and technological 
limitations of the current FBI “status quo” information sharing efforts necessitate the 
consideration of other options to further improve FBI information sharing with state, 
local and tribal (SLT) agencies.  The first option considered is the creation of a new 
homeland security “routine use” exception, which permits the sharing of PII necessary to 
resolve a predicated terrorist threat (i.e., allegation or information supporting a terrorist 
threat).  The second option is the Discoverability of Information approach, which indexes 
PII and other sensitive information in FBI case management systems for retrieval by 
outside SLT agencies through a technological solution.  The Discoverability of 
Information approach provides a reference number for the information, which enables the 
SLT agency to request this specific information from the FBI.  The final option examined 
in this thesis is the XML Segregation of Information approach, which uses XML 






documents.  This technology enables the FBI to create systems to share or protect the 
appropriate types of sensitive information with the particular outside agency or user. 
The “status quo” and the three proposed approaches were examined and 
compared using a two-phase analysis.  The first phase examines the effectiveness of the 
particular approach by rating performance or anticipated performance on the following 
factors:  (1) information shared, (2) privacy protected and (3) security.  These factors are 
analyzed by rating relevant criteria performance as low, medium or high.  All systems 
passed the ratings for each of the effectiveness factors, and proceeded to the second 
phase.  The second analysis phase examines the likelihood of successful implementation 
of these approaches by analyzing FBI cultural resistance, fiscal performance, utilization 
of technology and training for each approach.  The XML Segregation of Information 
approach outperformed all other options in this two-phase analysis.  The new homeland 
security “routine use” exception outperformed all other approaches on the information 
shared factor.  The Discoverability of Information approach also improved performance 
of information sharing over the “status quo.”  Ultimately, all three options resulted in 
some improvement over the “status quo” approach currently employed by the FBI. 
Combinations of these individual approaches are examined to determine if 
multiple approaches would outperform any individual approach.  The analysis of 
combination approaches results in the final thesis recommendation for the FBI to 
implement all three approaches to create a systematic, technological approach to 
dramatically improve information sharing with SLT agencies.  The combination of all 
approaches allows for the maximum sharing of terrorism and homeland security 
information with the new homeland security “routine use” exception, through the two 
technological approaches.  The Discoverability of Information approach enables the best 
information sharing performance for the FBI historical information, while the XML 
Segregation of Information approach enables the FBI to maximize the sharing of newly 
collected terrorism and homeland security information.  The implementation of any one 
or more of these approaches will have a net positive impact on FBI information sharing 






approaches.  The implementation of the approaches examined in this thesis is the next 
logical step to enable the FBI to substantially improve FBI information sharing with SLT 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been investigating 
terrorism threats to the United States through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which 
now have more than 4,400 members from over 600 state, local and tribal agencies (SLT) 
and 50 federal agencies at 106 locations across the United States (FBI, n.d. (b)).  Although 
the JTTFs are new, the FBI has been engaged in investigating terrorism since at least the 
1920s.  The FBI began investigating terrorism cases and threats in the 1920s with the 
Palmer Raids and Wall Street bombings (FBI, n.d. (k)).  Although the exact volume of 
information collected by the FBI during these decades of investigating terrorism matters is 
classified, the thousands of investigators must have generated an enormous volume of 
terrorism information of intelligence value.  Some of this information could be helpful to 
other agencies to enhance national security and prevent future terrorist attacks.   
Two major commissions concluded that information sharing is crucial for 
preventing another terrorist attack and protecting the United States.  This view is also 
widely held by not only the president, but also most others in the national command 
structure of the U.S. government.  The caveat in all the information sharing Congressional 
Acts, Presidential Orders and Executive Branch policies and plans is a variation of the 
requirement for the information sharing while ensuring the protection of all privacy, civil 
liberties and other legal rights.  In the 9 years since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government 
and SLTs have developed numerous “ad hoc” information sharing arrangements, but there 
still is not an effective and systematic method for information sharing.  The Markle 
Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age (Markle Foundation 
Task Force) described the criticality of information sharing in their March 2009 report: 
The 9/11 Commission identified ten lost “operational opportunities” to 
derail the 9/11 attacks—and most involved a failure to share information. 
Progress on information sharing is the single most important step required 
to improve the national security of the United States. If there is another 




understand nor forgive a failure to have connected the dots. Lack of 
progress on information sharing is a clear and present danger to the 
country. (p. 3) 
1. Obstacles to Information Sharing 
FBI information sharing is significantly restricted by regulations and policies 
created to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974.  This act mandates that “No 
agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means 
of communication to any person, or to another agency . . . unless disclosure of the record” 
was with the consent of the individual or meets 1 of 12 exceptions, including the 
exception permitting the information to be shared with other members of the agency with 
a “need for the record in the performance of their duties” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)).  These 
Privacy Act restrictions apply to personally identifiable information (PII) (5 U.S.C.  
§ 552a(a)(4)).  The Privacy Act defines an individual as any U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident alien (i.e., a U.S. Person) (5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)).  The primary 
exception permitting sharing PII in an information sharing is the “routine use” exception, 
which allows agencies to share PII in certain routine circumstances necessary for 
performance of the agency mission  that are announced to the public.   
2. “Ad Hoc” FBI Relationships for Information Sharing 
In addition to the Privacy Act prohibitions, the FBI faces many technological 
limitations and obstacles that complicate information sharing.  The FBI currently uses 
numerous “ad hoc” terrorism and homeland security information sharing relationships for 
to overcome the lack of an established and effective technological information sharing 
environment.  The FBI shares all requested terrorism information, excluding domestic 
terrorism information, with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  One of the 
primary “ad hoc” operational information sharing methods for the FBI with other federal 
agencies and SLTs is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The FBI Directorate of 
Intelligence (DI) and the Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) are primarily responsible for the 
production and dissemination of FBI intelligence to law enforcement and the United 




relationships with state Fusion Centers and USAI Regional Intelligence Centers.  The 
FBI also directly submits terrorism-related PII to three terrorism-related databases for 
watchlisting: Terrorism Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), Terrorism Screening 
Database (TSDB), and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Violent Gangs and 
Terrorist Offenders File (VGTOF).   
3. Distinction Between Intelligence and Information 
Information is a necessary precursor to intelligence; however, information is not 
transformed into intelligence until value is added through analysis.  The FBI defines 
intelligence on its public Internet Web site as “information that has been analyzed and 
refined so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions— specifically, decisions 
about potential threats to our national security” (FBI, n.d. (g)).  The sharing of 
information is critical to allow the FBI and other agencies to conduct the thorough and 
accurate analysis required to produce valuable intelligence.  This thesis seeks to address 
the problem of FBI information sharing as part of this intelligence process, but does not 
seek to address any issues related to conducting or sharing finalized intelligence.  
Enhanced, expanded FBI information sharing should have an overall positive impact on 
intelligence at all levels of government.  Finally, mechanisms created to communicate 
information could also effectively share intelligence products with agencies outside the 
FBI and USIC. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the best policy and technology available to enable the FBI to more 
effectively share terrorism and homeland security information maintained in FBI Case 
Management systems without violating privacy and civil liberty protections, including 
the Privacy Act of 1974? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research contributes to the existing literature on information sharing by 




approaches to expand the FBI sharing of terrorism and homeland security related 
information maintained in FBI case management systems.  The two-phase policy options 
analysis rating methodology in this thesis provides a flexible framework for future 
analysis of information sharing technologies and policies for any organization.  The FBI 
will be the primary beneficiary of this research, which will be able to use this research, 
methodology and analysis to evaluate three different alternatives and combinations to 
enhance the existing “ad hoc” FBI information sharing.  Ultimately, the entire homeland 
security community and leadership can utilize the methodology, the technology and the 
policies from this research to expand information sharing throughout the homeland 
security community.  Finally, the FBI implementation of any or several of the 
information sharing alternatives from this research would greatly expand FBI information 
sharing, which would improve the FBI information sharing compliance with the 
numerous information sharing mandates from the president, the Congress, the attorney 
general and the director of the FBI.  This enhanced terrorism and homeland security 
information sharing will also significantly contribute to the overall mission for the entire 
homeland security community to protect the U.S. from the terrorist threat. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II is the literature review for this thesis, examining the amount of 
information shared, privacy protected, security and trust.  The analysis and proposals of 
commissions and task forces, the government and the scholars are addressed for these 
issues.  The role and significance of the FBI in the sharing of terrorism and homeland 
security are also addressed. 
Chapter III provides a detailed explanation of the policy options methodology 
utilized in this thesis.  The limitations of this methodology and analysis are addressed.  
The chapter describes both phases of the analysis to determine the effectiveness of the 
information sharing approach and the feasibility of implementation of the approach.  The 
standards for rating the effectiveness factors and criteria and the implementation factors 




Chapter IV examines the current FBI information sharing “status quo” mandated 
by executive orders and legislation.  Specifically, numerous “ad hoc” policies and 
technologies developed, deployed and utilized by the FBI, since the attacks on 9/11 are 
addressed.   
Chapter V presents the three options examined by this thesis:  a new homeland 
security “routine use” exception, the Discoverability of Information and the XML 
Segregation of Information.  This chapter examines the capabilities and requirements of 
each of these approaches, including the technology requirements.   
Chapter VI analyzes all four approaches utilizing the evaluation factors developed 
from the literature review and the writer’s experience:  Information Shared, Privacy 
Protection, Security and Implementation.  This analysis examines the criteria for each 
evaluation factor, which is then rated as low, medium or high.  Finally, the chapter 
provides the overall analysis of all the approaches utilizing the rating approach described 
in Chapter III. 
Chapter VII presents the conclusions and recommendation developed from the 









II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information sharing has been an issue of interest and concern for the Federal 
government and other organizations for years.  However, the events of 9/11 escalated the 
federal government concerns over information sharing from one of many to one of the 
primary homeland security concerns.  This increased concern for information sharing 
generated a significant increase in publications on information sharing and related issues.  
A review revealed that the literature over the past 9 years can be generally broken into the 
following three categories:  (1) Task Force and Independent Commission Reports; (2) 
Government Publications and Statements; and (3) Scholarly Journals.  This literature 
review will examine how each of these categories of literature addresses the following 
critical information sharing aspects:  (1) Importance of Information Sharing, (2) Privacy 
and Civil Liberties, and (3) Security. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION SHARING 
“Information sharing is a critical activity for almost every institution” (Hexmoor, 
2006, p. 130).  Prior to 9/11, information sharing was an issue of concern for a wide 
variety of organizations, including businesses, governments and others.  The attacks on 
9/11 transformed information sharing from one of many issues for organizations into a 
critical, priority issue for all levels of government. The consensus of all three categories 
of literature was that government information sharing was ineffective prior to 9/11.  The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
concluded that information sharing was not a priority for the federal government before 
the attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 328).  The 9/11 Commission illustrated this 
ineffectiveness with their discussion of the impact of the Department of Justice “wall” 
procedures that were misunderstood and misapplied by the FBI prior to 9/11 (9/11 
Commission, 2004, pp. 78–80).  However, the 9/11 Commission warned that the often-
characterized problems of “watchlisting,” “information sharing” and “connecting the 
dots” were too narrow of a focus (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 400).  The Markle Task 




Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) also found deficiencies in 
information sharing, and the need for continued improvement of information sharing. The 
Markle Task Force produced its first information sharing report in 2002.  The WMD 
Commission dedicated an entire chapter on information sharing in its final report.  These 
three independent entities relied heavily on one another and created specific 
recommendations to address the identified information sharing deficiencies.   
The first U.S. government efforts to address information sharing began in October 
2001 when Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, with a mandate to ensure that there was 
no “wall” between criminal investigations and intelligence operations; and the creation of 
the Office of Homeland Security to integrate information and expand information sharing 
with Presidential Executive Order 13228 (GAO, 2006, p. 13).  These actions were the 
first official U.S. government determinations that expanded information sharing was 
necessary to improve homeland security.  The U.S. government continually and 
repeatedly asserted that information sharing is critical to national security in the more 
than 8 years of Congressional Acts, Presidential Executive Orders, Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Reports, National Strategies and executive speeches.  The 
GAO identified five Presidential Executive Orders and one Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD), which demonstrated the importance of information 
sharing and mandated changes to improve information sharing.  This GAO report also 
cited three Congressional Acts recognizing the importance of information sharing and 
mandating actions to improve information sharing (2006, pp. 9–13).  The U.S. 
government published the National Homeland Security Strategy in 2002, which 
“identified information sharing as a foundational element in protecting from, preventing, 
and responding to potential acts of terrorism” (GAO, 2006, p. 9).  The GAO published 
six reports addressing the critical nature of information sharing in homeland security, 
which ultimately led to their determination that information sharing was a “government-
wide high risk area” (2006, p. 9).  In October 2007, the administration of President 
George W. Bush demonstrated the criticality of information sharing with the publication 
of the National Information Sharing Strategy (NISS), which dealt exclusively with 




Intelligence Community (USIC) launched more than 100 initiatives to improve 
information sharing in the 3½ years following 9/11 (WMD Commission, 2005, p. 430).  
Numerous speeches by prominent members of the Executive Branch of the U.S. 
government expressed their personal and their agency’s opinion of the critical role of 
information sharing in protecting the United States from future terrorist attacks.  There 
were no significant contradictory views regarding the critical nature of information 
sharing in any of the government orders, publications or speeches. 
Many of the significant scholarly works also recognized the critical nature of 
information sharing in homeland security.  Professor William Pelfrey identified 
information sharing and collaboration as the two most important aspects of prevention, 
which is critical to the overall preparedness (Pelfrey, 2005, p. 9).  Professor Pelfrey 
quoted Michael O’Hanlon from the Bookings Institute for the proposition that “the 
challenge of interdicting terrorists before they can act centers around the effective 
mobilization of information” (Pelfrey, 2005, p. 9).  A common theme in the academic 
literature was agreement regarding the importance of information sharing for homeland 
security and other law enforcement functions (Bajaj, 2007, p. 29).  Scholarly works also 
explored the importance of information sharing in the context of other organizational 
relationships, including financial joint ventures.  However, the inherent differences in the 
nature of the relationships among commercial organizations from relationships amongst 
governmental organizations mitigated the relevance of these works to homeland security 
information sharing. 
B. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Almost every work addressing information sharing dedicated significant attention 
to the issue of protection of privacy and civil liberties.  This issue was the significant 
concern for many of the independent commissions, federal government actions, 
publications and statements, and scholarly works. 
The WMD Commission recognized the importance of privacy protection at the 
beginning of the civil liberties section of its information sharing chapter with the 




without noting that the sharing of information has raised privacy and civil liberties 
concerns in the wake of September 11” (WMD Commission, 2005, p. 445).  The Markle 
Task Force dealt extensively with privacy and civil liberties protections throughout all of 
their reports over the past 9 years.  The 9/11 Commission also addressed civil liberties 
and privacy in their information sharing section with three specific recommendations to 
protect civil liberties.  The 9/11 Commission quoted the Markle Task Force for their core 
proposition that it was critical to protect civil liberties and privacy to ensure public trust, 
which was essential for any effective information sharing effort (9/11 Commission, 2004, 
p. 419).  The WMD Commission also cited the Markle Task Force for the importance of 
protecting privacy and civil liberties.  
Despite this constant endorsement of the protection of civil liberties and privacy 
by these government actions and publications, they never provided specific, meaningful 
guidance for the actual implementation of information-sharing plans with appropriate 
civil liberties and privacy protections, including useful metrics.  They each mandated or 
endorsed maximum information sharing with strict adherence to all civil liberties and 
privacy protections mandated by law.  The Information Sharing Environment (ISE), 
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and 
corresponding Presidential Orders, published Privacy Guidelines and Privacy 
Implementation manuals on these significant issues.  However, the complex nature of the 
civil liberty and privacy protections from federal, state and local laws and policies made 
defining or comprehensively understanding privacy protection an almost insurmountable 
obstacle, which resulted in the delegation of the responsibility for defining and 
implementing these protections to the lowest government levels with the greatest 
familiarity of their own privacy and civil liberty issues, laws and policies. 
The scholarly publications also dealt extensively with the issues of privacy and 
civil liberties protections in homeland security information activities.  The RAND 
Corporation examined the history of domestic intelligence in the United States, which 
created or exacerbated many civil liberty and privacy concerns.  RAND devoted an entire 
section of the report Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options on 




acknowledged the importance of privacy protection “utilizing three subcategories: (a1) 
trust third party techniques, (a2) secure multi-party computation, and (a3) application 
specific techniques” (2005, p. 287).  A significant amount of the academic literature 
examined the legal aspects associated with privacy concerns related to information 
management, utilization and sharing.  Professor Kasper examines the difficult-to-define 
concept of privacy, especially its continuing evolution, including after the events of 9/11.  
Professor Kasper criticized the existing privacy literature for too specifically or broadly 
defining privacy based on specific topics, allowing cultural bias in the definition and the 
value-driven nature of these works (2005).  Professor Nelson examined the impact of 
technology and the events of 9/11 on privacy by examining the constitutional foundations 
for privacy and the public policy debate generated by the events of 9/11 on the issue of 
privacy (2004). The Heritage Foundation identified the potential of anonymization in 
their article about government use of commercial databases as a method to maintain 
privacy, while utilizing a necessary tool (Dempsey, 2004).  Overall, the scholarly works 
had extensive concerns over the privacy issues, but generally did not limit themselves to 
the context of terrorism and homeland security information sharing.   
C. SECURITY 
Security concerns were addressed in all three categories of works, but in far less 
detail than the issues of information sharing and privacy and civil liberties.  Security was 
frequently addressed as a reason for failures prior to 9/11 or a necessary requirement for 
effective information sharing.  The related issue of over-classification was frequently 
addressed as a significant obstacle to information sharing with SLTs, due to the limited 
number of individuals with security clearances and the limited number of communication 
and computer systems capable of storing and transmitting classified information. 
The independent commissions and task force addressed the issue of security in a 
limited manner, primarily as an information sharing obstacle.  However, they recognized 
the need to protect certain information for reasons beyond privacy and civil liberties.  The 
WMD Commission recommended assigning a high-level government official under the 




and the correlated protection through implementation of necessary security, including 
limitations on sharing.   The 9/11 Commission recognized the need for protecting 
information and the “need to know” standard, but criticized the existing system, which 
was created for the Cold War and relied on individual agency rules now being applied to 
the terrorism threat (2004, p. 417).  The 9/11 Commission did not make specific 
recommendations for security, since it primarily focused on expanded information 
sharing to enable more effective all-source analysis to address the terrorism threat.  The 
Markle Task Force primarily addressed security in the context of protecting civil 
liberties, while ensuring necessary access to information by appropriate personnel based 
on their role and need for information. 
Due to the unique nature of individual agency issues and the sensitivity of 
security to the particular agency, the U.S. government addressed security issues in more 
general and generic ways in strategies, publications, memorandums and speeches. As an 
example, the ISE provided a detailed business plans to deal with protecting the 
information shared through their environment in the ISE Implementation Plan.  The GAO 
addressed information sharing security issues, especially related to the complication of 
the sharing process created by the 56 different sensitive but unclassified information 
restrictions inhibit the ability to expansively share information (2006, p. 21).  President 
Obama, in his Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on 
Classified Controlled Unclassified Information, recently re-addressed is vast array of 
sensitive but unclassified classifications.  Earlier, President George W. Bush attempted to 
address this issue in his 2005 presidential memorandum (Obama, 2009).  Both 
administrations mandated a prompt remedy to this problem. 
The scholarly works recognized the issue of security, but primarily addressed it 
either as a necessary component of or a significant obstacle to information sharing.  
These scholarly works dealt with the technical issues associated with sharing and 
proposed alternatives or addressed the issue of trust as a necessary element of security 
and information sharing.  Professors Liu and Chetal proposed an information sharing 
approach based on an interest-based trust model, since they believed the current trust 




security” for information sharing instead of the current “hard security” (2006, p. 128).  
Both of these works extensively addressed the issue of trust related to security for 
enhanced information sharing.  Most of the other scholarly works either dealt with very 
specific security technology issues or the concept of security in information sharing. 
D. TRUST 
Trust is defined as ‘‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations regarding the intentions or behavior of 
others, irrespective of ability to monitor or control that other party” (Zolin, Hinds, 
Fruchter, & Levitt, 2004, p. 3).  Trust is a well-established area with extensive scholarly 
study and publications dealing with all major aspects of trust.  Numerous works in all 
three categories addressed the issue of trust.  The Markle Task Force emphasized public 
trust for information sharing, while the scholars primarily explored the issue of trust in 
the context of security or information sharing failures.  Reinhard Bachmann and Akbar 
Zaheer’s edited volume Handbook on Trust Research (2006), dealt extensively with 
traditional trust issues, including interpersonal, group and inter-organizational trust.  
Analysis of the current information sharing systems with SLTs by the commissions and 
scholarly works revealed significant reliance on trust due to the lack of any systematic 
method for information sharing, like the system proposed by the president, Congress, the 
Markle Task Force, and others related to information sharing.   
Professors Cook, Hardin and Levi examined the issue of trust in Cooperation 
Without Trust? (2005). They utilized the encapsulated interest model of trust, which 
considers the interests of the trusted party as perceived by the trusting party.  Under this 
model, trust exists when the trusting party believes that the trusted party’s interests are 
consistent or compatible with their interests on a particular issue or interaction (2005,  
pp. 5–8).  They cite a declining level of trust in society due to the increasing complexity 
of society and reduced reliance on trust in routine relationships. Instead, they proposed 
to “motivate cooperativeness through manifold devices” (2005, p. 197).  This work is 




that information sharing will take place in homeland security relationships with trust, 
lack of trust, and possibly affirmative distrust. 
The particular academic definition of trust either focused on psychological state 
and intention or on actual actions or rational interests, had a great influence on the 
perception of the necessity of trust in information sharing.  Trust is critical in the decision 
to share information and determining the appropriate extent of information sharing; 
however, the decision to share has already been made by the president and U.S. 
Congress.  Therefore, the existence trust, distrust or a lack of trust may influence the 
scope of sharing by particular individuals or organizations, but it will not change the 
fundamental decision to share.   
E. FBI INFORMATION SHARING 
As mentioned above, the FBI’s JTTFs throughout the country investigate 
terrorism threats inside the United States.  The information generated from these 
investigations would be valuable to SLT homeland security agencies.  This role and the 
vast amount of terrorism and homeland security information in FBI systems make the 
FBI a crucial participant in any meaningful information sharing effort. 
The 9/11 Commission rejected the idea of an American “MI-5”2 and provided a 
long list of recommendations for improvement of the FBI, including enhanced 
information sharing utilizing the existing JTTFs (2004, pp. 423–425).  The Markle 
Foundation Task Force described the FBI, as “the agency responsible for collecting 
intelligence on terrorists in the U.S. . . . the only U.S. domestic intelligence agency” 
(2003, p. 95).  The WMD Commission dedicated an entire chapter to the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) addressing concerns 
regarding all of these critical participants in homeland security.  The 9/11 and WMD 
Commissions both addressed the historical shortcomings of information sharing prior to 
9/11, the efforts to improve the FBI and the need for additional improvements in the 
future. 
                                                 





Numerous government publications addressed the role of the FBI in information 
sharing and plans for improving this information sharing.  The FBI expressed its 
information sharing strategy on their public Web site: 
The FBI’s National Information Sharing Strategy (FBI NISS) ensures that 
information is shared as fully and appropriately as possible with SLT 
partners in the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The FBI 
NISS is based on the principle that FBI information technology (IT) 
systems must be designed to ensure that those protecting the public have 
the information they need to take action. It also ensures that information is 
shared within the bounds of the Constitution. (FBI, n.d. (e), ¶ 1) 
The GAO also discussed the FBI’s role in information sharing, including sharing 
information through the JTTFs (2006).  The National Information Sharing Strategy 
(NISS) discussed changes to the FBI and its critical role in future information sharing.  
Executive Orders, Congressional Acts, strategies, speeches and other documents also 
came to a consensus that the FBI has a critical role in information sharing. 
As part of the DOJ Law Enforcement Information Sharing Plan (LEISP), the FBI 
utilizes numerous technologies to implement their information sharing efforts, including 
Law Enforcement Online (LEO), eGuardian, Regional Information Sharing Systems 
(RISS) and the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) with SLTs.  “LEO is a 24-hours-a-day, 
7-days-a-week, on-line, controlled-access communications and information-sharing data 
repository” (DOJ-OIG, 2007, p. 26) enabling the sharing of law enforcement, terrorism or 
other information on a secure network accessible from the Internet anywhere in the 
world.  eGuardian is a FBI computer system for reporting Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SAR) through Fusion Centers to the JTTFs for further investigation or analysis.  SARs 
can be submitted or reviewed by SLTs and federal law enforcement agencies by 
accessing eGuardian through LEO (FBI, 2008 September 19).  eGuardian has been 
incorporated as the FBI component of the Shared Space utilized for the National SAR 
Initiative (NSI) implemented as part of the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE, 
2009, pp. 18–19).  RISS is a DOJ information sharing system accessible through LEO 
and other computer systems to facilitate sharing criminal intelligence that complies with 




being developed and implemented by the FBI to allow federal and SLT law enforcement 
systems to share criminal information.  N-DEx will enable these agencies to identify 
previously unknown connections between entities or places utilizing information in N-
DEx maintained by the other law enforcement agencies participating in N-DEx (FBI, 
2008 April 21). 
The role of the FBI in information sharing was not a primary focus of the 
scholarly works, which focused more on the macro issues of security, privacy and 
national security.  Michael O’Hanlon expressed his view that in “any prevention-based 
information strategy, the FBI will be crucial.  It is a core agency in collecting information 
about potential terrorists, a focal point for collating and analysis, and—as a law 
enforcement agency—an essential user of information” (O’Hanlon, 2002, p. 13).  The 
other scholarly works did not focus significant attention on the FBI’s role beyond 
examining the historical failures of the FBI and other agencies prior to the attacks.  Their 
primary focus was creating the capacity to share information throughout the federal, 
SLTs and private entities to protect homeland security. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Many works from a variety of government and non-governmental sources, 
including independent commissions and task forces, federal government sources and 
scholarly works, examined pre-9/11 information sharing failures by the FBI, intelligence 
and military organizations.  A review of the literature showed no work, which disputed 
the value of information sharing, but they all recognized the importance of protecting 
privacy and civil liberties.  Despite this recognition, none of these works provided a 
comprehensive analysis of these privacy limitations.  In most instances, this 
responsibility was delegated to those implementing the information sharing efforts and 
the owners of the underlying information.  Information security was addressed to a much 
lesser extent, but was recognized as a potential significant impediment to effective 
information sharing.   
Trust was cited frequently as a vital aspect of information sharing related to other 




critical role in the current “ad hoc” sharing efforts and will likely play a role in future 
information sharing, the overall decision to trust SLTs with expanded information sharing 
has already been unequivocally endorsed by the president, the Congress and other 
prominent members of the U.S. Executive Branch.  The current role of trust in 
information sharing and the well-established nature of the field of study on trust 
significantly reduced the need for further examination of this issue in the homeland 
security information sharing.   
It is clear from the available literature that the FBI must play a prominent role in 
future information sharing efforts.  Many of the works focused less on the roles of 
specific entities and instead on specific recommendations or comprehensive approaches 
to information sharing.  The FBI has repeatedly asserted its commitment to information 
sharing, but the available information indicates that the primary focus on this effort will 
continue to be primarily dependant on “ad hoc” methods, like the JTTF, FIG and Fusion 
Centers.  Unfortunately, these “ad hoc” methods are susceptible to obstructive behavior 
by individual FBI employees, who may be opposed to sharing information, overly 
protective of information or other obstructionist motivations.  The FBI is developing 
improved technologies, including: eGaurdian, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Regional 
Information Sharing System (RISS) and N-DEx.  The overall field of information sharing 
related to homeland security has been extensively explored; nevertheless, there is still a 
need for work on the implementation of a systematic information sharing approach at 










A. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS APPROACH 
This thesis will utilize Policy Options analysis to assess several policy and 
technology options for improving FBI terrorism and homeland security information 
sharing with SLT homeland security agencies.  The analysis will be divided into two 
distinct phases.  The first phase will analyze the probable effectiveness of the four 
approaches utilizing the following effectiveness factors and criteria identified from the 
literature review and writer’s experience (Table 1). 





Relevance Public Perception Sensitive/ Classified Info 
Accuracy Privacy Act Compliance Access Control 
Timeliness Privacy Impact Assessment Compliance/Audit 
 
The literature review revealed that these three effectiveness factors and their 
corresponding criteria are all critical for all information sharing systems.  Failure to 
accomplish any individual effectiveness factor would result in the failure of the overall 
system or approach.  The three criteria for each effectiveness factors are also all required 
for any effective information sharing system or approach.  The failure of any of these 
criteria would likely result in the overall failure of the corresponding effectiveness factor, 
which would result in the failure of the system or approach.  The critical nature of all the 
effectiveness factors and their corresponding criteria resulted in them all essentially being 
of equal importance in the overall assessment of the effectiveness of an information 
sharing system or approach.  Therefore, each of the effectiveness factors and criteria were 




The criteria for each effectiveness factor will be rated as low, medium or high 
based on their anticipated performance.  The definitions of low, medium and high 
performance for each individual criterion were created from the literature review and the 
writer’s 12 years of experience as a FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent on 
the Boston Division Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The detailed description of the 
standards for rating each criterion will be addressed in later sections of this chapter.  The 
ratings will be converted into a numerical value with each criterion given 1 point for a 
low rating, 2 points for a medium rating and 3 points for a high rating.  A higher overall 
score indicates that the particular information sharing approach is a better option than 
approaches with lower overall scores.   
The second phase of analysis examines four significant factors that are necessary 
for the successful implementation of any information sharing system or approach.  These 
factors will not determine the effectiveness of the approach or system, but they will 
influence the probability of successful implementation of the particular approach or 
system in the FBI.  The following implementation factors were identified from the 
literature review and the writer’s experience:  cultural resistance, fiscal performance, 
utilization of technology and training.  These implementation evaluation factors will also 
be analyzed utilizing an equal weighting.  These factors will be rated in the same manner 
as the effectiveness factor criteria.   
B. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
Analysis of FBI information sharing is necessarily a qualitative instead of 
quantitative process, since the FBI does not currently quantitatively report the amount of 
terrorism and homeland security information that is collected, shared or withheld for 
privacy protection or other reasons.  This limitation prevents the writer from effectively 
measuring the amount of terrorism and homeland security information or data in terms of 
characters, pages, documents or gigabytes in FBI information systems.  The FBI currently 
does not have an effective means for measuring and publicly reporting the amount of 




amount and type of terrorism and homeland security information likely to be collected in 
the future prevents this analysis from projecting future effectiveness. 
Surveys were considered as an alternative quantitative measurement tool, but they 
are also significantly limited in their effectiveness as a measurement tool for actual FBI 
information sharing.  They can measure the perception of information sharing, but they 
do not measure the actual effectiveness and amount of information shared in the current 
or proposed approaches.  This measurement tool is also limited by the fact that there are a 
relatively limited number of persons with extensive knowledge of the type and amount of 
information collected and maintained by the FBI and a corresponding knowledge of the 
information needs of the SLT homeland security agencies.  The largest identifiable 
groups meeting all of these criteria are current and former JTTF TFOs, which were 
surveyed by the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (DOJ-OIG) in 2004 to 
assess their satisfaction with information sharing and other JTTF-related issues.3  
These significant measurement limitations require this analysis to examine each 
of the options based on the potential for information sharing, rather than actual or 
projected information shared.  The analysis will generally assume that users and agencies 
will follow the policies and procedures to ensure the maximum information sharing 
permitted in the particular approach or technology, unless otherwise noted.  Therefore, 
the analysis of these options represent the potential for information sharing, while the 
actual implementation of information sharing for any of these approaches will be 
dependant on the implementation factors from the second phase analysis and the actual 
implementation of any of these approaches by the FBI. 
C. EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS AND CRITERIA STANDARDS 
Phase one analyzes the effectiveness factors criteria addressed in the following 
sections of this chapter.  These criteria will be rated to determine the overall effectiveness 
of each approach for the particular factor and overall. 
                                                 




1. Information Shared 
The literature review revealed and common sense dictates that the amount and 
quality of information actually shared is a critical evaluation factor for determining the 
effectiveness of any information sharing system or approach.  This effectiveness factor 
will be analyzed utilizing the following equally weighted criteria:  relevance, accuracy 
and timeliness.  The FBI expressed the importance of these criteria for information 
sharing in the FBI NISS vision statement asserting, “The FBI is committed to sharing 
timely, relevant, and actionable [emphasis added] intelligence to the widest appropriate 
audience” (FBI, 2008, ¶ 2). 
a. Relevance 
It is critical for any information sharing approach to provide relevant 
terrorism and homeland security information to the recipient.  However, it is difficult to 
identify what is currently relevant and what will be relevant in the future for every 
recipient or potential recipient.  The other critical aspect of this criterion is to minimize 
the irrelevant information that is provided, which could obscure relevant information or 
confuse the recipient. 
b. Accuracy 
Inaccurate, relevant information is of extremely limited value, since it 
creates a greater risk of erroneous actions or decisions.  The literature review identified 
accuracy as another critical element for any information sharing approach or system.  
Traditional intelligence and investigative techniques have certain inherent accuracy and 
reliability issues, since the information may be obtained covertly from individuals or 
organizations attempting to conceal that information.  Therefore, information for 
purposes of this information sharing analysis is “accurate” when it correctly 
communicates the information contained in the FBI systems, regardless of the underlying 





The final important criterion for assessing the information shared is 
timeliness.  Relevant, accurate information may have no value when it is not received in a 
timely manner. 
d. Standards for Rating Information Shared 
The effectiveness for the criteria will be rated as low, medium or high 
based on the following scale (Table 2). 
Table 2.   Description of Standards for Ratings of Information Shared 
Effectiveness Evaluation Criteria 




























































2. Privacy Protection 
The literature review demonstrated the critical nature of ensuring maximum 
privacy protection for any information sharing system.  Shared information and privacy 
protection are at opposite ends of the same spectrum, with the balance between these two 
ends critical for information sharing systems.  Privacy protection is the second critical 
effectiveness factor, which will be analyzed and rated utilizing the following criteria: 
public perception, adherence to the Privacy Act and Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA).  
The FBI recognized the critical importance of privacy protection in the FBI NISS guiding 
principle for information sharing, which asserted: 
The FBI adheres to both Attorney General and DNI guidelines for 
information sharing, ensuring that intelligence and law enforcement 
information is shared with relevant partners while protecting sensitive 
information and the privacy and civil liberties of US persons [emphasis 
added] . . . Share information within the framework of US laws, DOJ 
LEISP Privacy Policy, and ISE Privacy Guidelines, ensuring the FBI 
protects privacy rights and civil liberties of US persons [emphasis added]. 
(FBI, 2008, ¶ 5 & 6) 
a. Public Perception 
Public perception is critical with potential for a significant impact on the 
privacy protection effectiveness factor in any information sharing system.  A negative 
public perception can easily lead to the abandonment of any information or data 
exploitation approach, like the $54 million Total Information Awareness (TIA) “data 
mining” system proposed by DoD to identify terrorists operating in the United States 
after 9/11. “By September 2003, the hysteria against TIA had reached a fevered pitch and 
Congress ended the research project entirely, before learning the technology's potential 
and without a single ‘privacy violation’ ever having been committed” (MacDonald, 2004, 
¶6).  After TIA, privacy advocates turned their attention to Computer Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System (CAPS II), a Transportation Security Agency (TSA) tool designed 
to confirm identities and pre-screen passengers on flights.  These groups were successful 




Tom Ridge in July 2004.  This ultimately led to a more limited $100 million pre-
screening system named “Secure Flight” (Sternstein, 2004).    
These two high-profile episodes illustrate the potential detrimental impact 
of a perceived negative privacy effect on any homeland security information technology 
approach.  Public perceptions represent a significant risk to any FBI technological 
information sharing approach, and could result in a mandate for significant re-
engineering or abandonment of any proposal. The FBI Investigative Data Warehouse 
(IDW) system also was subject to attacks based on privacy concerns, but this FBI system 
survived attacks by privacy advocacy groups and Congressional inquiries (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 2009).  IDW, originally developed under the name Secure 
Collaboration Operational Prototype Environment (SCOPE), stored more than 1 billion 
government records from numerous federal government sources by its completion in 
2005 (DOJ-OIG, 2007, p. 25).  The writer reviewed the circumstances surrounding and 
factors involved in the termination of TIA and CAPS II compared with the successful 
completion and implementation of IDW in an effort to determine why IDW survived 
privacy based attacks, while TIA and CAPS II were destroyed or damaged by similar 
attacks.  Unfortunately, this examination only confirmed the complex nature of public 
perception and its impact on systems or approaches that impact privacy in the United 
States.  There was also public criticism of the potential privacy invasion from the FBI 
eGaurdian SAR reporting system, but those public criticisms have not led to a significant 
negative public perception against the little-known system officially launched by the FBI 
(Nojeim, 2009).  It is nearly impossible to accurately predict when opponents to a system 
will be successful at generating negative public perception, which could ultimately 
damage or destroy the proposed system.  Numerous factors can play a significant role 
influencing this public perception; however, there are too many intangibles to reliably 
predict public perception.  Therefore, public perception will be impossible to analyze 




b. Privacy Act Compliance 
The U.S. Congress created the Privacy Act of 1974 to protect PII 
information of U.S. Persons maintained in any federal government system of records.  
This Act is one of the primary privacy protection means for U.S. Persons.  It would be 
politically and legally impossible to create an information sharing system or approach 
that violated the Privacy Act; however, the human element involved in all information 
sharing systems or processes creates potential for violations when there are insufficient 
controls or oversight.  This potential for individuals to violate the Privacy Act and related 
policies and procedures is the focus of analysis for this factor. 
c. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
The E-Government Act of 2002 Section 208 mandates the federal 
government to conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) for all new or proposed 
information systems involved in the collection, storage or dissemination of PII (Public 
Law 107-347).  DOJ mandates the creation of a PIA utilizing their standard form 
published on the agency public Internet Web site.  A review of the DOJ PIA template and 
guidance revealed that the most relevant section to assess information sharing with 
outside agencies is Section 5 (U.S. DOJ, n.d. (c)).  The existing “status quo” approach 
does not have a single PIA for all of them, but several of the newer components have 
PIAs available on the FBI public Internet site.  The writer created PIA Section 5 utilizing 
the DOJ PIA template for each of the approaches, and evaluated them against the existing 
FBI PIAs utilizing criterion in the next section (FBI (n.d. (i)). 
d. Standards for Rating Privacy Protection 
The effectiveness for the criteria will be rated as low, medium or high 







Table 3.   Descriptions of Ratings Standards for Privacy Protection 
Effectiveness Factor Criteria 






























































Security is a vital aspect of any information system.  Security is the final critical 
evaluation factor analyzed to assess the overall effectiveness of each system or approach.  
Security inhibits the amount of information shared, which is necessary to ensure the 
willingness and ability of the information owner to share their information.  Security is 
also critical for assuring the public that privacy will be fully protected.  The FBI NISS 
and DOJ LEISP both recognized the essential role of security in all information sharing.  
This was clearly expressed by the FBI NISS vision statement: 
The FBI is required to effectively balance the need to effectively and 




investigative operations, national security information, [emphasis added] 
and the privacy and civil liberties of US persons. (FBI, 2008, ¶ 2) 
The following criteria will be analyzed to rate the effectiveness of security for 
each of the approaches:  handling of classified/sensitive information, access control and 
compliance/auditing. 
a. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) 
The E-Government of 2002 Act, Title III, also known as the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), “requires each federal agency 
to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide information 
security for the information and information systems that support the operations and 
assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, 
or other source” (NIST, n.d., ¶ 1).  Compliance with FISMA was not analyzed, since the 
DOJ requires all computer systems to comply with all FISMA requirements.  Therefore, 
any approach utilizing a computer system that does not comply with FISMA would not 
be permissible regardless of the other capabilities of that system. 
b. Handling of Sensitive and Classified Information 
FBI counterterrorism reporting almost always contains classified and 
sensitive information comingled with unclassified information.  The FBI uses paragraph 
marking to document the highest level of classified information in each paragraph in a 
document.  It is impossible to differentiate which portions of the paragraph are actually 
classified, and to what level.  Under the current system, an FBI Original Classifying 
Authority (OCA) is the only person permitted to officially determine the level of 
classification for any portion(s) of a classified paragraph.  The OCA has the authority to 
either de-classify the entire paragraph or redact appropriate portions of the paragraph to 
make it unclassified. 
The FBI collects and maintains a large variety of unclassified sensitive 
information that also must be protected from unauthorized disclosure mandated by 




handling requirements continually change over time.  The FBI must comply with all 
restrictions on all classified and sensitive information obtained or maintained in FBI 
terrorism and homeland security-related investigations.  These restrictions are frequently 
created and modified by agencies and officials outside the FBI.  These statutory, 
regulatory and policy mandates to protect the variety of classified and sensitive 
information make this an essential effectiveness evaluation criterion for security.  Even 
infrequent, intermittent violations could destroy a system or prevent its development or 
deployment. 
c. Access Control 
There is inherent risk in granting access to any information or information 
system, which must be addressed in any information sharing system.  It is vital for any 
information sharing approach to grant access only to those with a legitimate need for the 
information, while protecting information from unauthorized users.  This is one of the 
core security issues for all existing and future government computer systems, which 
makes it a critical criterion for the security effectiveness factor. 
d. Compliance and Audits 
The last integral security aspect is assurance that sharing and withholding 
classified information is conducted appropriately only with authorized users for a 
legitimate purpose.  Robust auditing capabilities allow for effective compliance review of 
all policies and procedures.  This review is easier to conduct in an electronic system, but 
is still possible for a manual information sharing approach to have robust auditing to 
ensure compliance.   
e. Standards for Rating Security 
The effectiveness for the criteria will be rated as low, medium or high 




Table 4.   Description of Ratings Standards for Security Effectiveness  
Factor Criteria 







































































D. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION 
The second phase of analysis will examine the likelihood of successful 
implementation of any system or approach determined to be effective in phase one.  
Research for this thesis, and the writer’s experience, identified the following critical 
factors for determining the likelihood that the FBI could successfully implement an 
information sharing system or approach:  cultural barriers, fiscal performance, utilization 
of technology and training requirements.  A failure or low rating for any one or more of 




necessarily preclude the implementation of the particular system or approach.  The FBI 
can overcome complications associated with these factors by dedicating additional 
resources and effort to overcome poor performance or failure of these factors.  Despite 
the ability to overcome these factors, the analysis of these factors is still critical to the 
overall evaluation of every system or approach to accurately assess the likely FBI 
resources and effort required for successful implementation. 
1. Cultural Barriers 
Organizational structure is the key values, guiding beliefs, understandings, 
symbols, rituals and myths of an organization.  Culture is critical and defines an 
organization.  It is the “glue that holds organizations together” (Hennessey, 1998, p. 525).  
The FBI has been a law enforcement agency for more than 100 years, and has developed 
a distinctive culture.  This culture has evolved over time with significant influences from 
numerous transformations and generations of employees.  After the attacks of 9/11, many 
FBI critics focused on the need to change FBI culture, or used FBI culture as justification 
for creating a domestic security or intelligence agency in the United States.  Director 
Mueller told the National Press Club in Washington, DC “‘FBI culture’ is the ethic of 
hard work, integrity, excellence and dedication to protecting the American public, all 
within the confines of the Constitution.  I see this culture every day, in every FBI office, 
and in every FBI employee” (Mueller III, 2003, ¶ 26).  The FBI NISS expressly 
recognized the importance of information sharing and the need to create a culture of 
sharing at all levels in the FBI with the following guiding principle: 
[f]oster a culture of sharing [emphasis added] both within the FBI and 
between the FBI and its federal, state, local, and tribal partners. Encourage 
information sharing and integration— fusing “all crimes with national 
security implications” with “all hazards” information. (FBI, 2008, ¶ 6) 
FBI culture is difficult to define, and is subject to different interpretations by different 
groups and individuals inside and outside the FBI.  It has been recognized that there may 
be multiple different cultures within an organization (Hennessey, 1998, p. 525).  It was 
not feasible to conduct surveys or interviews to comprehensively and effectively identify 




resistance and barriers to these new proposed approaches primarily by considering the 
severity of the change required for the new approach and the utilization of technology to 
mitigate potential resistance to this change.  If the change is consistent with existing FBI 
culture, then some, many or most of the 30,000 FBI employees should embrace the 
proposed change.  The impossibility of predicting the reaction of over 30,000 employees 
and TFOs makes evaluating and measuring the likelihood of acceptance extremely 
difficult. 
2. Fiscal Performance 
The FBI had a negative, expensive experience with the development of the 
Virtual Case File (VCF) case management system, the original Automated Case Support 
(ACS) replacement.  The failure to deploy this system cost the taxpayers more than $100 
million (Mueller III, 2005).  This experience made the FBI more sensitive to the potential 
for a failed system and its corresponding financial and operational losses.  The 
development and identification of a thorough and accurate estimate of the expenses of 
any computer system or approach is difficult an early stage of consideration.  This 
analysis will assess the costs of these approaches in generic terms of minimal, significant 
or substantial.  The FBI currently spends $451 million to develop and deploy Sentinel 
(DOJ-OIG, 2009, p. 8), spent over $12 million developing, deploying and upgrading the 
FBI’s Threat Tracking system Guardian 2.0 and has already spent over $137 million on 
the development and testing of N-DEx, with more than an additional $101 million 
projected expenditure to complete this system as planned by the Fall of 2010 (U.S. DOJ, 
2010).4   This history of large expenditures for computer systems was the frame of 
reference utilized to judge the potential expenses and proportional savings from each of 
the proposed approaches.  For purposes of this analysis, any approach that costs less than 
the $12 million (cost of Guardian) would be assessed to have no significant costs, 
anything between $12 million and $250 million (total cost of N-DEx) would be assessed 
as significant and anything above $250 million would be assessed as substantial costs. 
                                                 
4 Expenses for Guardian and N-DEx are procurement expenses and not total expenses associated with 





3. Utilization of Technology 
The FBI recognized the importance of integrating modern information technology 
in the FBI NISS, which identified information technology as their second primary 
objective (FBI, 2008).  The DOJ LEISP and IRTPA of 2004 also recognized the critical 
role of information technology in information sharing approaches.  Technology is critical 
to the creation and implementation of all FBI terrorism and homeland security 
information sharing approaches.  The FBI specifically addressed the critical role of 
technology in the following FBI NISS guiding principle: 
Leverage existing platforms and develop new technology to enhance our 
information sharing capabilities. Continue to adopt new technology and 
invest in IT infrastructure [emphasis added] that are compliant with 
federal standards, meet FBI needs, provide auditable information integrity 
and quality, provide the appropriate level of security, and allow for strong 
community user identification and authentication. (FBI, 2008, ¶ 6) 
4. Training Requirements 
The final critical factor for evaluating the implementation of any system is the 
training requirements.  Training is critical to minimize negative impact of cultural 
barriers and ensure appropriate and effective utilization of technology.  Inadequate 
training could be a significant barrier to successfully improving information sharing.  
Training demands are critical due to the large number of non-FBI employees, including 
SLT representatives from over 18,000 law enforcement and homeland security agencies, 
with a significant role in these approaches and extremely limited ability to be personally 
trained by FBI.  The FBI asserted the importance of training in implementation of 
enhanced information sharing in the FBI NISS recognition that “education and training on 
information sharing will be widely available and required by both new and current FBI 




5. Standards for Rating Implementation Factors 
The following standards will be utilized to rate each of the critical implementation 
factors (Table 5). 
Table 5.   Description of Standards for Ratings of Implementation Factors 



















































































IV. CURRENT FBI INFORMATION SHARING 
In response to the numerous government mandates after the 9/11 attacks, the FBI 
has enhanced terrorism and homeland security information sharing with the USIC, 
federal and SLT homeland security agencies.  This process created a complex 
interrelationship between systems and processes that developed in an “ad hoc” manner 
over these years. 
A. INFORMATION MAINTAINED BY FBI 
The FBI currently operates unclassified, Secret and Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) computer networks to facilitate storage and 
communication of information, including terrorism and homeland security information.  
The primary network used by the FBI is a Secret network connected to the USIC, 
homeland security and Department of Defense (DoD) through the DoD Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) (Bald, 2005).  The FBI classified and unclassified 
terrorism and homeland security information and intelligence are stored on this Secret 
network, including the Automated Case Support (ACS) and Sentinel case management 
systems. 
1. FBI Reporting Documents 
The FBI primarily documents information collected in national security and other 
investigations in FD-302s, Electronic Communications (EC) and FD-1023s.   The FD-
302 and EC are currently created in WordPerfect utilizing a macro.  The reporting SA, 
TFO or IA enters the information contained in these reports into a free-form format with 
the different types of sensitive and classified information comingled with minimal 
markings.5   The FD-1023 is a new form for documenting Confidential Human Source 
(CHS) reporting utilizing a XML format document, which is created and viewed with 
Microsoft’s InfoPath software.  This form segregates some information, but the substance 
                                                 




of the reporting and a significant amount of comingled sensitive and classified 
information is still primarily embedded in a single section of this XML document.  These 
documents are stored electronically in the FBI’s ACS case management system, which is 
being replaced by Sentinel (described in greater detail below).    
These free-form FBI reporting documents with sensitive and classified 
information comingled significantly complicate the ability of the FBI to effectively share 
information beyond the FBI, especially with SLT homeland security agencies.  The FBI 
does not currently have the technology either to extricate or anonymize the sensitive and 
classified information in these documents, which would be required to enable automated, 
electronic information sharing.  These forms and other technology issues limit the FBI to 
“ad hoc” manual methods of information sharing that require an individual SA, TFO or 
IA to manually review documents and redact the sensitive or classified information from 
the document, or to create a new document, without the sensitive or classified 
information, that is suitable for sharing with the particular individual or group that needs 
the information. 
B. FBI CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The FBI Privacy Act official system of records is the FBI Central Records System 
(CRS), which includes the paper files maintained in all the FBI Field Offices.  The 
majority of FBI information and intelligence is electronically stored in the FBI case 
management system. 
1. Automated Case Support (ACS) 
The Automated Case Support (ACS) computer system was created in 1995 to 
allow for electronic storage of FBI case documents utilizing “universal serialization” 
accessible to FBI personnel throughout the world on the FBI Secret computer network 
(Fine, 2002).  ACS is a “green screen” environment that requires the user to utilize 




mouse, commonly used on most modern computer systems (Higgins, 2002).6  The DOJ 
OIG conducted numerous audits of ACS, and concluded that ACS “uses outmoded 
technology, is cumbersome to operate, and does not provide necessary workflow and 
information-sharing functions” (DOJ-OIG, 2008, p. vi).  The FBI unsuccessfully 
attempted to replace ACS with Virtual Case File (VCF), which failed and was abandoned 
by the FBI in 2005.  This eventually led to the new FBI Case Management system, 
Sentinel, currently under development (Mueller III, 2005).   
ACS has built-in text search capabilities to locate terrorism and homeland security 
information.  Additionally, SAs, TFOs, IAs and others can also search this information 
stored in ACS through the FBI Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW), which contains 
multiple other data sets and a more effective search capability than ACS (Mueller III, 
2005).  In 2006, FBI Assistant Director John Miller responded to a critical Newsweek 
article with the following description of the capabilities of IDW and ACS in counter 
terrorism investigations: 
Investigative Data Warehouse, a computer system developed in-house, 
with off-the-shelf software connects over a billion counter terrorism 
records, and the Automated Case Support System, cross indexing 
everything from a major suspect to an obscure name found on the back of 
scrap-paper in an Afghan cave to a suspicious financial transaction report 
filed with the Treasury Department. It also searches across data in forty 
other federal agencies to “connect the dots.” These tools and others, 
developed since 9/11, available to agents and analysts across the country 
and around the world, have helped thwart a number of terrorist plots in the 
U.S. over the past five [5] years. In fact, just in the past year, terrorist 
plans in Torrance, Calif., Atlanta, New York, Washington, Miami, and 
Toledo, Ohio, were detected and disrupted. The FBI also played a key role 
in the interdiction of plots in the U.K, Canada, Bosnia and a number of 
places that cannot be disclosed because operations continue. (¶ 2) 
The FBI is currently transitioning to a new case management system, Sentinel, 
which is described in greater detail in the following section.  The FBI FD-302s and ECs 
                                                 
6 “Green screen” refers to the earliest computer systems that were incapable of displaying color and 
required all commands to be typed on the keyboard.  This refers to the earliest commercial computer 




are still created in free-form documents uploaded into ACS.  The FBI is currently 
developing new XML forms to replace the existing FD-302 and EC in Sentinel. 
2. Sentinel 
Designed by Lockheed Martin, Sentinel is a Web-based case management system 
designed to handle all FBI investigations and intelligence operations.  Phase One of this 
program was delivered in June 2007 with significant portions of Phase two delivered in 
the summer of 2009.  The FBI expects final delivery of Sentinel in the summer of 2010 
(Mueller III, 2008).  Director Mueller informed the House Judiciary Committee that 
Sentinel was “one of our [the FBI’s] most important programs” (Mueller III, 2009, ¶ 17).  
Sentinel is a program with integrated commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components.  
Sentinel will have electronic information management, automated workflow processes, 
search capabilities, and information sharing capabilities with other federal, state, local 
and tribal law enforcement agencies and the USIC (DOJ-OIG, 2008, p. 1).   FBI Director 
Mueller expects Sentinel to utilize XML documents to facilitate enhanced information 
sharing capacity (Mueller III, 2005).  The FBI recently experienced complications with 
the development and deployment of Sentinel, which led the FBI to report a delay in 
completion until an unspecified date in 2011, and a revised estimated cost above the 
expected $451 million (DOJ-OIG, 2010, p. 2).  
C. PRIVACY ACT LIMITATIONS 
FBI information sharing is significantly restricted by FBI regulations and policies 
designed to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act mandates 
that “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by 
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency . . . unless disclosure of 
the record” was with the consent of the individual or meets 1 of 12 exceptions, including 
an exception that permits the information to be shared with other members of the agency 
with a “need for the record in the performance of their duties” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)).  The 
Privacy Act restrictions apply to personally identifiable information (PII), which is 




maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial 
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his 
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the 
individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4)).  The 
Privacy Act defines an individual as any U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident alien 
(i.e., a U.S. Person) (5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)).  The primary exception permitting expansive 
sharing of PII is the “routine use” exception.  The “routine use” exception permits an 
agency to share Privacy Act records for any purpose compatible with the original purpose 
for collection in accordance with a “routine use” published in the Federal Register.  
Numerous other statutes and rules also impose restrictions upon information collected by 
sensitive sources or means, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), Right to 
Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and others. 
The FBI promulgated policies to apply all the necessary restrictions to FBI 
Privacy Act Systems of Record, including the FBI Central Records System (CRS).  The 
FBI CRS Systems of Records Notice (SORN) was published in the Federal Register, as 
required by the Privacy Act.  The FBI published fifteen Privacy Act Blanket Routine Use 
(BRU) exceptions applicable to the CRS (FBI, n.d. (d)).  BRU-1 authorizes sharing a 
Privacy Act record when the record on its face or when combined with other information 
establishes a violation of law, regulation, rule, order or contract.  This authorizes the 
record to be disclosed to an entity responsible for its enforcement, including SLTs and 
other federal agencies.  There is a similar exception in the Privacy Act itself that allows 
for the sharing of this type of information with a written request of the head of the agency 
detailing the information needed and the criminal or civil enforcement purpose (5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(a)(4)).  BRU-1 removes the need for the FBI to get this written request from the 
head of the agency.  BRU-6 permits disclosure when mandated by federal statute or 
treaty (FBI, n.d. (f)).  The FBI added BRU-14 and BRU-15 in 2005 to permit the 
disclosure of Privacy Act records to SLTs for purposes related to the hiring and retention 
of employees and licensing.  BRU-1 inhibits the sharing of FBI terrorism and homeland 




primarily intelligence investigations that do not necessarily involve an immediately 
apparent potential or actual criminal violation.  BRU-6 is even more restrictive, since the 
laws, orders, regulations and policies limit the disclosure by existing privacy and other 
legal protections.  None of the other FBI BRUs provide a lawful basis for sharing any 
terrorism or homeland security related Privacy Act records in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner.  Therefore, the Privacy Act currently inhibits the FBI from 
providing sufficient Privacy Act records to allow for meaningful terrorism and homeland 
security information sharing beyond current “ad hoc” relationships.  The FBI has the 
legal authority to unilaterally create additional “routine uses” under the Privacy Act  
(5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D)).  There is a certain amount of information sharing inherent in 
all investigations involving other agencies, including joint investigations; however, this is  
also conducted in an “ad hoc,” limited manner, controlled by the Privacy Act. 
D. FBI “AD HOC” SHARING EFFORTS 
The FBI engages in numerous “ad hoc” terrorism and homeland security 
information sharing relationships to overcome the lack of an established and effective 
technological information sharing system.  The FBI shares all terrorism information, 
excluding domestic terrorism information, requested by the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC).  NCTC is the focal point that co-locates more than 30 intelligence, 
military, law enforcement and homeland security networks to facilitate maximum 
information sharing of all terrorism information in the possession of the United States 
Government (USG) (NCTC, n.d.).  NCTC uses this information to create finished 
intelligence products to share throughout the USIC.  The FBI also shares information 
with the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG), which is made up 
of state and local agency members “established to develop coordinated intelligence 
reports and analytical products regarding terrorist threats and related issues that address 
the needs of state, local, tribal, and as appropriate, private sector entities” hosted at the 




1. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is the primary “ad hoc” operational means 
of terrorism and homeland security information sharing with other federal agencies and 
SLTs.  Members have a top secret clearance, which grants them to access most terrorism 
and homeland security information in FBI files and electronic systems.  JTTF liaison 
contacts are not required to have a security clearance, and are limited in their access to 
terrorism and homeland security information by their clearance level (DOJ-OIG, 2005,  
p. 18).  The FBI shares PII with JTTF TFOs pursuant to the Privacy Act exception that 
allows sharing PII with agency officers and employees with a “need to know” (5 U.S.C.  
§ 552a(b)(1)).  Unfortunately, this exception does not authorize TFOs to provide the PII 
information to their parent agency without a separate Privacy Act exception or “routine 
use.”  This exception addresses JTTF operational necessity and permits situational 
awareness for the parent agency through their TFOs, which is accomplished through 
regular member meetings.  The frequency of these meetings varies according to the 
situation and needs of the individual JTTF.  The JTTF holds Executive Board meetings 
on at least a quarterly basis to facilitate information exchanges with heads of other 
agencies and other top-level managers from participant agencies (DOJ-OIG, 2005, p. 37).  
A DOJ-OIG survey of JTTF members in 2004 revealed that 77% of the respondents rated 
the quality of the information sharing at these meetings as Good to Excellent (DOJ-OIG, 
2005, p. 32).   This JTTF “ad hoc” information sharing does not facilitate significant FBI 
PII sharing in an expansive and effective manner beyond these informal meetings with 
JTTF members and their management. 
For example, the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist 
who killed 13 and wounded 33 during his attack at Fort Hood in November 2009, 
illustrates these current limitations on sharing information capacity with JTTF participant 
agencies.  The FBI Baltimore JTTF conducted a threat assessment of contacts by Major 
Hasan with the subject of a JTTF terrorism investigation in December 2008.  This threat 
assessment was conducted by a TFO from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service 
(DCIS), who concluded that these communications were consistent with research being 




the limitations and procedures for sharing information with the JTTF TFO parent agency 
in the following press release related to the Major Hassan threat assessment: 
Standard protocols—based on federal law, regulations, and policy, 
including the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts—govern 
information handling in federal task force settings, including JTTFs. 
JTTF-generated information may only be disseminated outside the 
structure of the JTTF (including to a member’s home agency) with the 
approval of the JTTF FBI supervisor. In this case, following the review 
and analysis conducted by investigators, there was a conclusion made by 
the investigator and the supervisor that Major Hasan was not involved in 
terrorist activities or planning. Further dissemination of the information 
regarding Major Hasan was neither sought nor authorized. (FBI, 2009, 
November 11, ¶ 8) 
2. Field Intelligence Group (FIG) 
The FBI Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and the Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) 
are primarily responsible for FBI intelligence production and dissemination to law 
enforcement and USIC.  The FIG maintains “ad hoc” information and intelligence 
sharing relationships with fusion centers and USAI regional intelligence centers with 
embedded SAs or IAs with on-site access to the FBI Secret computer system, including 
ACS and Sentinel.  Access to the FBI Secret computer network at Fusion Centers enables 
the FBI personnel to perform their mission at the center with a secure means of classified 
communication.  In 2007, the FBI reported a total of 256 FIG personnel, including 123 
IAs, were assigned to 36 Fusion Centers across the U.S. (Mines, 2007).  The DI and FIG 
disseminate intelligence and information through Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) 
(“raw intelligence”) Intelligence Bulletins (IB), Situational Intelligence Reports (SIRs) 
and Intelligence Assessments (“finished intelligence”) (FBI, n.d. (h)).  The Privacy Act 
restricts this “ad hoc” sharing and dissemination of intelligence publications by the DI 
and FIG to the same standards applied to the JTTFs.  FBI intelligence publications do not 
routinely provide PII in compliance with Privacy Act restrictions, USIC and DI 
requirements.  Access to or utilization of FBI computer systems for Fusion Center 




3. Terrorist Watchlist Information Sharing 
The FBI submits terrorism-related PII to three terrorism databases: Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), and the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Violent Gangs and Terrorist Offenders File 
(VGTOF).  This information can also be submitted to additional appropriate databases or 
lists, including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) selectee or no-fly lists, 
the Department of State and other watchlists.  Approximately 400,000 individuals are 
listed on the terrorist watch lists, but most are not U.S. citizens.  There are approximately 
3,400 people on the no-fly list, of whom approximately 170 are U.S. Persons (Healy, 
2009).  TIDE is a classified terrorist database maintained by NCTC with some of the 
derogatory terrorism information to support nominations to the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB), which is commonly referred to as the “terrorism watchlist” maintained 
by the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) (Boyle, 2007).  In fiscal year 2009, the TSC 
had approximately 19,000 positive hits for known or suspected terrorists on the TSDB 
from over 55,000 “encounters” by federal and SLT agencies (Healy, 2009).  TSC 
Director Timothy J. Healy identified the following standards for an individual being 
placed on the TSDB to the U.S. Senate in December 2009: 
First, the biographic information associated with a nomination must 
contain sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can be 
matched to or disassociated from a watchlisted terrorist. Second, the facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard of review established by terrorist screening 
Presidential Directives. Reasonable suspicion requires “articulable” facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant a 
determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or has been 
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to 
terrorism and terrorist activities, and is based on the totality of the 
circumstances. Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that 
a person can draw from the facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate “hunches” 
are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. (¶ 7) 
However, the Attorney General Guidelines that govern all domestic FBI 
investigations, including counter terrorism and national security investigations, allow the 




investigative techniques (AGG-DOM, 2008).  Therefore, FBI counterterrorism threat 
assessments and preliminary investigations PII will not be available to the SLTs through 
the TSC due to the watchlisting standards mandated by HSPD 6 (Healy, 2009). 
VGTOF contains PII of FBI suspected terrorists, and is accessible through the 
unclassified NCIC system, which is available to law enforcement agencies throughout the 
U.S.  This information is only available to authorized users of NCIC, who are restricted 
from sharing this information to unauthorized individuals.  These systems function as 
“pointer systems,” providing the TSC as point of contact to arrange collaboration and 
information sharing between the requesting agency and the FBI.  The Privacy Act limits 
all subsequent communications between the FBI and requesting agency. 
4. The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC) 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, all 93 United States Attorneys Offices 
(USAO) created the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC), formerly called the 
Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (ATTF).  The U.S. Attorney General memorandum dated 
9/17/2001 directed the ATTFs to “coordinate the implementation of an operational plan 
for preventing terrorism, serve as the conduit of information about suspected terrorists 
between federal and local agencies, and coordinate the district’s response to a terrorist 
incident” (DOJ-OIG, 2005, p. 11).  There were approximately 11,000 ATAC members in 
2004.  The DOJ-OIG distinguished the ATAC from the JTTFs, which are “primarily 
investigation oriented. Although the FBI field offices engage in information sharing, they 
meet primarily with law enforcement officials, and the information sharing is more 
narrowly focused than the information disseminated by the ATACs”  (DOJ-OIG, 2005,  
p. 31).  The ATACs hold monthly or quarterly meetings to facilitate information sharing.  
The FBI participates in these ATAC meetings as a means of information sharing beyond 
the members of the JTTF and law enforcement community.  These meetings are limited 
in their level of classification by the security clearance and “need to know” of the 
attendee with the lowest level security clearance and least “need to know.”  A DOJ-OIG 
survey in 2004 revealed that 77% of the ATAC respondents rated the value of the 




E. CURRENT FBI INFORMATION SHARING TECHNOLOGIES 
The FBI shares information and intelligence with other agencies through multiple 
independent systems, including LEO, RISS, eGuardian, NSI, N-DEx, and OneDOJ.  
These are described in greater detail below. 
1. Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 
Law Enforcement Online (LEO) is a “secure, Internet-based communications portal 
for law enforcement, first responders, criminal justice professionals, and anti-terrorism and 
intelligence agencies around the globe” (FBI, n.d. (a), ¶ 3).  LEO was originally created in 
1995 as a dial-up system with only 20 members to facilitate enhanced collaboration and 
information sharing.  It has expanded to over 100,000 users.  LEO is accessible via the 
Internet through a virtual private network (VPN).  LEO organizes and controls “sensitive 
but unclassified” information by placing that information in controlled access Special 
Interest Groups (SIGs).  The owner of the SIG controls the type of information posted 
there, and grants or revokes permission to LEO users to access this information.  LEO has 
emergency management capability with Virtual Command Center (VCC), which enables 
real-time information sharing and situational awareness for users granted access to the 
VCC for a particular threat, case or event (FBI, n.d. (a)). 
The FBI operates several SIGs on LEO to share information and finished 
intelligence products.  Intelligence products disseminated on LEO are also available 
through the DHS, Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) (Bald, 2005).   
2. Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) 
The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) was created by DOJ, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA), 30 years ago to support criminal investigations and 
prosecutions throughout the U.S.  RISS was created and is funded to address regional 
crime and information sharing problems in the six RISS regions across the U.S.  In 1997, 
RISS created RISSNET, a secure intranet system to facilitate communication and 




intelligence information, which requires “reasonable suspicion” pursuant to Federal 
Regulation 28 CFR Part 23.  RISS is accessible through LEO.  RISS currently has 8,100 
member agencies from federal, state, local and tribal agencies in all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England (RISS, n.d.).  RISS 
provides access to unclassified FBI intelligence products, but it does not provide access 
to FBI computer systems and raw information. 
3. eGuardian and National SAR Initiative (NSI) 
eGuardian is a computer system designed to facilitate sharing terrorism-related 
suspicious activities to the JTTF through Fusion Centers in a secure, efficient, electronic 
manner.  This system integrates with the FBI Guardian Threat Tracking system used by all 
FBI Field Offices to investigate unpredicated terrorism-related threats and suspicious 
activities.  eGuardian was originally created independent of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE), which is fully integrated as the FBI component of this system.  
eGuardian is now fully functional and available to law enforcement agencies throughout 
the world on LEO.  An eGuardian incident reviewed and approved by the agency and its 
Fusion Center is viewable by all other members of eGuardian for the duration established 
by the submitting agency (up to 5 years).  All eGuardian incidents with a nexus or 
inconclusive nexus to terrorism are maintained in eGuardian with FBI disposition notes.  
All eGuardian incidents with no nexus to terrorism are removed from eGuardian to protect 
civil liberties and privacy (FBI, 2008, September 19).  The FBI reports all Internet tips 
received from the public in the eGaurdian system for investigation by the JTTFs (FBI, 
2009, June 26).  Ultimately, the future of this system will be determined by its effectiveness 
and utilization by federal agencies and SLTs.  It is important to recognize that terrorism 
SARs are the proverbial “searching for a needle in the haystack” approach to identifying 
potential terrorists.  The ISE reported, in November of 2009, that approximately 1,500 
incidents were submitted to eGaurdian, with only 66 of them ultimately being determined 
to have some probable nexus to terrorism (Black, 2009).  However, given the significant 
potential consequences of a successful terrorist attack, every opportunity must be pursued 




The ISE-PM is developing a “Shared Space” concept to facilitate sharing 
terrorism-related information.  eGuardian will be the FBI conduit to this “Shared Space.”  
The ISE-PM created a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a National SAR Initiative 
(NSI) to standardize reporting of terrorism-related SARs as mandated by the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) released on December 23, 2008 (PM-ISE, 2008).  
The ISE-SARs will be accessible by fusion centers, authorized federal, SLT law 
enforcement agencies, DHS Headquarters, and the FBI’s JTTF and FIGs to support 
regional and national analysis. (PM-ISE, 2008)  In December 2008, the PM-ISE made a 
detailed announcement regarding the ISE-SAR Evaluation Environment (ISE-SAR EE) 
deployed to several sites to assess the technical, business practices and other aspects of 
the proposed NSI implementation (PM-ISE, 2008).   The ISE reported, in October 2009, 
that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) ISE-SAR EE collected over 1,900 
terrorism-related SARs, with only 126 ultimately referred to the JTTF.  More than 40 
reported from front-line officers leading to arrests (Back, 2009). 
4. Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) 
The Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) is a computer system 
being developed by the FBI under the DOJ LEISP.  It encompasses a “national 
information-sharing system available through a secure Internet site for law enforcement 
and criminal justice agencies . . . to search and analyze data using some powerful 
automated capabilities, helping to connect the dots between people, places, and events” 
(FBI, 2008, April 21, ¶ 5).  The FBI expects to fully deploy N-DEx in the summer of 
2010, which would make it accessible to approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies 
across the country.  Once fully deployed, N-DEx is expected to have the following 
capabilities: 
 Nationwide searches from a single access point; 
 Searches by “modus operandi” and for clothing, tattoos, associates, 
cars, etc.—linking individuals, places, and things; 
 Notifications of similar investigations and suspects; 
 Identification of criminal activity hotspots and crime trends; 
 Threat level assessments of individuals and addresses; and 




N-DEx consolidates information from all participating law enforcement agencies.  
These agencies share or restrict their information in N-DEx to ensure their security, 
privacy and other requirements.  N-DEx will not contain any new information that does 
not already exist in other law enforcement computer systems.  It will contain only 
criminal justice information, and not intelligence information.  Information accuracy will 
be controlled by the contributing agency in accordance with N-DEx policy pursuant to 
the mandatory Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  Recipient agencies may not use 
or further disseminate N-DEx information without permission of the originating agency, 
except in exigent circumstances.  N-DEx recognizes the following exigent circumstances 
permitting immediate action with subsequent notice to the originating agency: 
(a) there is an actual or potential threat of terrorism, immediate danger of 
death or serious physical injury to any person, or imminent harm to 
national security; and 
(b) it is necessary to disseminate such information without delay to any 
appropriate recipient for the purpose of preventing or responding to that 
threat. (FBI, 2007, Section 4) 
5. OneDOJ 
OneDOJ, also known as Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx), is a LEISP data 
repository of criminal controlled unclassified information (CUI) from the DOJ law 
enforcement components, including FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Marshals Service 
(USMS) and Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).  The DOJ described the primary purpose 
of OneDOJ in their Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) as: 
Sharing criminal law enforcement information across the Department and, 
secondarily, with state/local/tribal law enforcement agencies in order to 
more effectively investigate, disrupt, and deter criminal activity, to protect 






OneDOJ is accessed by a secure VPN over the Internet and administered by the 
FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division in West Virginia.  OneDOJ 
contains both structured and unstructured, free-text documents created by the DOJ law 
enforcement components. 
An authorized OneDOJ user can conduct searches of the system data by person, 
place or thing.  The user will be notified of the existence of a document responsive to the 
search, which the user can review on the system and/or request by directly contacting the 
contributing agency.  Information obtained by a recipient user or agency from OneDOJ 
may not be used as the basis for any action or disseminated outside the agency without 
written permission from the contributing agency.  This rule expressly prohibits the 
recipient user or agency from placing this information in an official case file or using the 
information in preparation of subpoenas, warrants or affidavits.  An exigent 
circumstances exception identical to N-DEx allows the immediate dissemination or 
further action on the information in limited exigent circumstances (U.S. DOJ, 2008, p. 9).   
OneDOJ enables the sharing of information in the system for homeland security 
purposes utilizing the following Privacy Act “routine use” exceptions: 
To a criminal, civil, or regulatory law enforcement authority (whether 
federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, or foreign) where the information is 
relevant to the recipient entity’s law enforcement responsibilities. 
To a governmental entity lawfully engaged in collecting criminal law 
enforcement, criminal law enforcement intelligence, or national security 
intelligence information for law enforcement or intelligence purposes . . . 
In an appropriate proceeding before a court, or administrative or 
adjudicative body, when the Department of Justice determines that the 
records are arguably relevant to the proceeding; or in an appropriate 
proceeding before an administrative or adjudicative body when the 
adjudicator determines the records to be relevant to the proceeding. (U.S. 
DOJ, 2008, pp. 9–10)7 
                                                 
7 OneDOJ has several other Privacy Act “routine use” exceptions that are not likely to be relevant for a 




OneDOJ is limited to authorized law enforcement personnel in participant 
agencies with a MOU with the DOJ.  OneDOJ contains virus protection, boundary 
security systems and encryption to protect system data.  OneDOJ maintains logs and 
conducts audits to ensure compliance by agencies and users with the OneDOJ rules, 
which can be enforced against the individual or agency.  OneDOJ complies with all 
requirements mandated by the U.S. Congress in the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA, 44 U.S.C. § 3541) (U.S. DOJ, 2008, pp. 15–18).  
OneDOJ is accessed through an open, XML-based, NIEM-compliant standard called 
LEXS-SR, which regulates the interface between OneDOJ and regional sharing systems 




V. ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS 
This thesis analyzes the existing status quo discussed in Chapter IV with the 
following three alternatives to improve FBI information sharing with SLT homeland 
security agencies: (1) a new Homeland Security “Routine Use” Exception to the Privacy 
Act; (2) XML Segregation of Information and (3) Discoverability of Information.  This 
chapter provides a detailed description of these three alternatives. 
A. NEW HOMELAND SECURITY “ROUTINE USE” EXCEPTION 
This option addresses the legal limitations of the Privacy Act with current FBI 
“routine use” exceptions discussed in Chapter IV.  This option is not a technology 
solution like the other two, but it could be utilized with either or both of the proposed 
technology solutions to expand the overall scope of FBI terrorism and homeland security 
information sharing.  The FBI’s current approach significantly limits terrorism and 
homeland security information sharing by utilizing key “routine uses” created before the 
9/11 attacks or intended to address non-homeland security requirements and threats.  The 
exact scope of permissible terrorism and homeland security information sharing under the 
existing “routine use” exceptions may cause confusion among FBI employees and TFOs, 
which creates an increased risk that some terrorism and homeland security information 
will not be shared by individual FBI personnel to ensure compliance with the Privacy 
Act, unless the investigation is a terrorism case involving clear criminal law violations.  
The Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Operations of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (AGG-DOM) authorize investigations of threats to national security without 
requiring establishment of a specific violation of a federal statute.  The existing “routine 
use” exceptions inhibit the ability to create and utilize robust technology solutions for 





1. Process for Creating New “Routine Use” 
The FBI can unilaterally modify or expand the existing “blanket routine use” 
exceptions by creating a new proposed “routine use” exception compatible with the 
purpose for which the information was originally collected, and by publishing the new 
proposed “routine use” exception in the Federal Register.  The public and interested 
parties are given an opportunity to comment on the proposed “routine use” exception 
within 30 days.  The Office of Budget and Management (OMB) is given 40 days to 
review and comment on the proposed “routine use” exception.  The OMB determined 
that a “routine use” is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected when it is 
either “functionally equivalent” or “necessary and proper.” The courts have provided 
different rulings, but they have not been overly restrictive (Markle Foundation Task 
Force, 2002, pp. 129–130). 
Congress exercises its oversight authority on modifications to the “routine uses” 
through public hearings.  However, the resulting Congressional recommendations are not 
binding on the proposing agency, unless Congress enacts a law addressing the new 
proposed “routine use.”  The Markle Foundation Task Force’s review of the Privacy Act 
concluded that many agencies do not abide by Congressional advice in these 
circumstances, and provided the following Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) example: 
The CIA, for example, proposed one of the broadest of routine uses—one 
covering all of its systems of records to allow disclosure “whenever 
necessary or appropriate to enable the CIA to carry out its 
responsibilities.”  Congress objected to the rule as overly broad and made 
a series of recommendations to narrow it. The CIA ignored them, 
however, and published the routine use as planned.  While this type of 
circumvention has continued for most of the Privacy Act’s life, the trend 
very recently may be toward a slightly narrower construction of the 
exemption. (Markle Foundation Task Force, 2002, p. 130) 
2. Proposed New FBI Homeland Security “Routine Use” Exception 
The author reviewed existing FBI and other agency “routine use” exceptions to 





use” exception would ensure the greatest sharing of homeland security and terrorism-
related information with federal and SLT homeland security agencies, while still 
providing substantial privacy protections: 
The FBI may share homeland security or terrorism-related personally 
identifiable information (PII) as a “routine use” when it is necessary to 
assist another agency investigating a homeland security threat or 
investigation to resolve that threat or investigation when the shared PII 
relates to individual(s) who may be a homeland security or terrorism-
related threat or target. 
 
An individual may be a threat to homeland security if the FBI or any other 
agency has information, an allegation indicating or an articulable factual 
basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates the following: 
 
a. An activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the 
national security has or may have occurred, is or may be 
occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may 
obtain information relating to the activity or the 
involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization 
in such activity. 
 
b. An individual, group, organization, entity, information, 
property, or activity is or may be a target of attack, 
victimization, acquisition, infiltration, or recruitment in 
connection with criminal activity in violation of federal law 
or a threat to the national security, and the investigation 
may obtain information that would help to protect against 
such activity or threat. 
 
The FBI may rely on the determination by the outside agency that the 
information is necessary and their determination that there is a sufficient 
factual basis for this “routine use” exception, unless the FBI has reason to 
believe these determinations are erroneous based on specific, reliable 
information in its possession.  
This “routine use” exception would clearly define what is meant by terrorism and 
homeland security information based on federal statutes.  The following definitions from 
existing federal statutes would be utilized to ensure clarity: 
Terrorism Information—Terrorism Information is defined in IRTPA 
Section 1016 (codified at 6 USC 485) as all information, whether 
collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, 




 The existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, means of financial or material support, or 
activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or 
individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved 
in transnational terrorism; 
 Threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United 
States, United States persons, or United States interests, or 
to those of other nations; 
 Communications of or by such groups or individuals; or 
 Groups of individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or 
associated with such groups or individuals. 
 
The definition includes weapons of mass destruction information. 
 
Homeland Security Information—Homeland Security Information, as 
derived from the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 
Section 892(f)(1) (codified at 6 USC 482(f)(1)), is defined as any 
information possessed by a state, local, tribal, or federal agency that: 
 
 Relates to a threat of terrorist activity; 
 Relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt 
terrorist activity; 
 Would improve the identification or investigation of a 
suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or 
 Would improve the response to a terrorist act. 
 
This proposed “routine use” exception was created after the author could not 
locate a more appropriate existing or proposed “routine use” exception that would more 
effectively accomplish the goal of expanded terrorism and homeland security information 
sharing and privacy protection.  The CIA “routine use” was not used, since it is too broad 
for a hybrid law enforcement and intelligence/domestic security agency like the FBI. 
B. XML SEGREGATION OF INFORMATION 
This approach will utilize technology to segregate the different types of classified 
and sensitive information from the other information.  This will enable the most 
expansive information sharing possible for each potential recipient, while complying with 
all the policies and regulations for different types of sensitive information.  Once the 




system(s) to make this information available to the widest possible audience in a secure 
and efficient manner.  The following sections address the capabilities and limitations of 
existing technology available to securely, effectively and accurately segregate the 
different types of classified and sensitive information. 
1. Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a W3C-endorsed meta-markup language 
using simple plain language tags to store data in a plain text format.  The basic unit of 
markup (tag) and data (text) is called an element.  Any program capable of reading plain 
text can display all the elements of a XML document.  XML documents resemble Hyper 
Text Markup Language (HTML) documents.  XML documents are not limited to a fixed 
set of tags like HTML documents.  This flexibility allows XML tags to continually be 
modified to address the needs of any group or system at any particular time (Harold, 
2004, pp. 3–4). 
XML documents that meet the basic XML grammar rules, for example, what the 
tags look like and where they are placed, are said to be “well-formed.”  Any XML parser 
can read a well-formed XML document without rejecting the document.  Markup 
describes the structure of the document, including which elements are associated with 
each other and what type of data can be contained in a specific element (i.e., date, name, 
social security number, etc).  The permissible markup for an XML application can be 
defined in a schema, which can be in the XML document itself or in a separate document.  
Document Type Definition (DTD) is the schema recognized by W3C that defines all 
legal markups for a particular document, including where and how it can be stored in the 
document.  These DTDs have limited capabilities, which led to the creation of numerous 
other schemas for expanded functionality and capabilities (Harold, 2004, pp. 3–5). 
XML is only a markup language, which means that it is not a programming 
language, a network transport protocol or a database.  However, XML has the capability 
to interact with software that performs these functions.  For example, a Web browser can 
use HTTP to transmit and receive XML documents or the documents can be converted 




it an excellent format for allowing different systems or programs to communicate with 
each other without the complication and expense of creating additional software or 
requiring a built-in capability to translate proprietary binary data of one program into the 
other.  “XML offers the tantalizing possibility of truly cross-platform, long-term data 
formats” (Harold, 2004, p. 6). 
The following is an illustration of a simple, well-formed XML (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   Illustration of a Well-Formed XML 
2. National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) 
NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a partnership of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. It 
is designed to develop, disseminate and support enterprise-wide 
information exchange standards and processes that can enable jurisdictions 
to effectively share critical information in emergency situations, as well as 
support the day-to-day operations of agencies throughout the nation. 
(NIEM, n.d., ¶ 1) 
NIEM is a product of Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), 
which expanded on their work with Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) with the 
creation of this new standard.  NIEM is a reference model, which means that 
organizations are not required to adopt the entire system without modification.  NIEM 
has already been adopted by 31 states and a variety of federal and local agencies for their 
information-sharing initiatives (Wormeli, 2009, p. 34). 
The Program Manager Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) utilizes 
NIEM for the NSI “to better enable ISE participants to share ISE-SAR information in a 
 <person> 
  <name> 
   <last_name> Gomez </last_name> 
   <first_name> Peter </first_name> 
  </name> 





standard format” (PM-ISE, 2008, p. 2).  eGuardian, the FBI SAR reporting mechanism, is 
integrated into the NIEM-compliant NSI Evaluation Environment (PM-ISE, 2009).  
NIEM provides a list of standardized XML tags and rules to facilitate integration with 
multiple current and future homeland security systems.  NIEM enables an FBI system 
like N-DEx to integrate with analytical commercial software, such as Coplink and 
Analyst Notebook, currently being used by law enforcement, military and intelligence 
agencies in the United States and throughout the world. 
3. “Named Entity Recognition” (NER) Technology 
The voluminous number of existing FBI reporting documents with comingled 
sensitive and classified information creates a significant problem for effective information 
sharing beyond current “ad hoc” methods.  XML technology with appropriate policy, 
training and implementation will not address this problem with legacy FBI documents 
without the addition of some other technology or the expenditure of significant resources.  
One technology with potential for identifying PII in existing documents is “Name Entity 
Recognition” (NER), which uses computational linguistics to identify and classify words or 
group of words as particular entities, like persons, places or things.  NER “is relatively 
simple and it is fairly easy to build a system with a reasonable performance, [but] there still 
exist many problems of ambiguity, robustness and portability, which make it difficult to 
attain the human performance” (Zhou & Su, 2005, p. 190).  NERs are based on rules 
established to identify entities for the particular domain or organization.  The current trend 
in NER is to utilize machine-learning technologies, like Hidden Markov Model (HMM), to 
automate the process of establishing the rules for the specific NER.  Numerous different 
systems with both machine-learning (ML) and expert created rule-based systems (Rule) 
were tested by Zhou and Su for accuracy.  The expert rule-based systems generally 
outperformed the comparable machine-learning systems.  Zhou and Su conducted 
experiments to test the performance of different NER approaches, including their own 
PowerNE approach, with precision defined as “the number of the correct entity names in 
the answer file over the total number of the entity names in the answer file” (Zhou & Su, 





Figure 2.   Comparison of Performance of NERs (From Zhou & Su, 2005, 
p. 202) 
Unfortunately, the performance of the different NER systems ranges from 
approximately 85% to somewhere above 95%, which leaves some PII unidentified in 
documents.  Therefore, the use of this technology, to tag PII for anonymization, removal 
or converting into a particular tag in a XML document, would not meet the legal 
mandates of the Privacy Act and FBI privacy policies.  This technology could reduce the 
burden on a manual review by pre-tagging a large percentage of the PII, which would 
reduce the amount of PII that would need to be tagged by individuals.  However, a 
manual review of all the FBI documents still would be necessary, and would be reduced 
only minimally by the use of NER technology to pre-tag potential PII. 
NER technology does not address the need to remove classified information from 
any documents that are shared with an unclassified computer system, since the 
documents are marked with their overall classification and each paragraph is marked with 
its highest classification level.   Therefore, it would need to remove the entire paragraph 
containing any classified information.  This would also remove a great deal of valuable 
unclassified terrorism and homeland security information comingled in the paragraph.  
The fact that computers instead of an OCA conduct this process may also create problems 





government.  Finally, NER and other technologies would have to be modified to identify 
other sensitive information to be removed.  The same problem of accuracy would remain 
for this other sensitive information. 
Based on available technology, it is highly unlikely that the FBI would be able to 
easily and effectively transform a significant portion of the historical unstructured data in 
its computer systems into a structured format like XML.  However, it would still be 
possible to use the NER technology, especially with machine learning-based systems, to 
create an index of entities maintained in FBI systems with a reference to the original 
document.  This type of Discoverability of Information approach is discussed in the next 
section and analyzed as one of the policy options. 
C. DISCOVERABILITY OF INFORMATION 
The Privacy Act, security concerns and storage of the FBI case information on a 
classified network significantly complicates information sharing with SLT homeland 
security agencies.  The current “ad hoc” approaches have either a “push” or “pull” 
mechanism for information sharing.  The originator of the information can “push” the 
information out to the entities the originator believes need or want the information.  The 
“pull” approach requires the individual or agency requiring the information to 
affirmatively request the information from the potential information originator based on 
their best guess or belief that the agency has, or may have, relevant information.  The 
intelligence process addresses this obstacle by publishing intelligence requirements that 
clearly express the needs of a particular agency to other members of the USIC.  SLT 
homeland security agencies can request intelligence or information through formalized 
“requests for information” (RFI) or through the informal “ad hoc” relationships.  The 
Discoverability of Information approach seeks to remedy these shortcomings by enabling 
authorized users to search a database or index of FBI information to determine if there is 
information of potential value.  The information may not be directly available in this type 
of system, but the system allows the user to submit a request to the originator for specific 





about the particular subject matter.  This system also alleviates the burden on the FBI of 
conducting the search or making a determination of which recipients may need the 
information. 
1. Markle Foundation Task Force Proposal 
The Markle Foundation Task Force proposed the Systemwide Homeland Analysis 
and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network, a de-centralized Discoverability of 
Information approach.  The Markle Foundation Task Force preferred this approach over 
sharing all the information with every user, since that “could increase the threat to civil 
liberties, heighten the risk of a leak of sensitive information, cause uncoordinated action 
by different agencies, and simply overwhelm the recipients” (Markle Foundation Task 
Force, 2003, p. 12).  The SHARE Network was proposed as a “peer-to-peer” system 
allowing “on demand” and “ad hoc” information sharing.  The Markle Foundation Task 
Force suggested a directory to facilitate communication between and identification of 
subject matter experts across agency lines.  They also recommended the use of XML 
technology, previously discussed in this chapter, to allow for identification of information 
of value to outside agencies through the SHARE Network.  The Markle Foundation Task 
Force recognized the need for security, recommending the use of technologies like smart 
cards, information rights management and anonymization to protect sensitive information 
from unauthorized users or uses.  They acknowledged the lack of a 100% solution to 
ensure security, but suggested a combination of these and other developing technologies 
to ensure effective security.  The SHARE Network requires robust auditing with 
immutable logs to ensure the proper access, use and protection of information (Markle 
Foundation Task Force, 2003, pp. 8–17). 
2. German Counter-Terrorism Database 
On December 31, 2006, the Federal Republic of Germany government 
implemented the Act on Setting up a Standardized Central Counter-Terrorism Database 
of Police Authorities and Intelligence Services of the Federal Government and the 




creation of a counter-terrorism database (Schäuble, n.d.).  The law requires participating 
agencies, which include both police and intelligence agencies, to store basic information 
on the subjects of their investigations, and some subject contacts, for offenses of 
participating in or supporting an international terrorism organization, or unlawfully using 
or inciting the use of violence to enforce political or religious interests.  The law also 
requires storing the same type of basic information for individuals with more than a 
superficial or coincidental contact with a person committing the offense or organizations, 
groups, foundations or businesses where there is the potential to obtain additional 
information for investigating and fighting international terrorism (Bundestag, 2006, p. 2).  
The German law requires submission of the following basic information to the counter-
terrorism database: 
surname, first name, previous names, other names, aliases, divergent 
spellings of names, sex, date of birth, place of birth, country of birth, 
current and previous nationalities, current and previous addresses, special 
physical features, languages, dialects, photographs, name of the category 
pursuant to Section 2, and information on identity documents (basic data) 
if this does not violate other legal provisions and is necessary to identify a 
person. (Bundestag, 2006, p. 2) 
The law also requires extended basic data for the subjects of these investigations 
and any contacts “aware of the planning or commission of an offence.”  The law requires 
the following additional information:  telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, vehicles, 
banking information, special skills, religious affiliation and other relevant data 
(Bundestag, 2006, pp. 3–4). 
The German counter-terrorism database mandates greater identifying information 
than the current U.S. terrorist watchlists discussed in Chapter IV.  The TIDE database has 
the capability to maintain much of the extended data required in the German Counter-
terrorism database.  Unfortunately, TIDE is maintained on a highly classified computer 
network.  VGTOF requires searches with a name and one other identifier through the 
unclassified NCIC network, which significantly reduces its utility in comparison to the 





enforcement agencies, while the German database is limited to officials involved with 
counterterrorism operations at all levels in German government granted access to the 
database (Bundestag, 2006, p. 5). 
The German counter-terrorism database has the capability to protect highly 
sensitive information by partially or wholly storing the extended basic information in 
restricted storage.  There is also the capability to store all the information in “covert 
storage” to ensure that no one has access to even the basic information of the 
investigation.  When a search is conducted of data in “covert storage,” the agency that 
entered the information will be immediately notified and is obligated to determine 
whether they can share the information as intelligence with the searching agency 
(Bundestag, 2006, p. 5).  VGTOF has a similar capability, but without the express 
requirement for subsequent contact by the originating agency to the requesting agency, 
for a “silent hit.” 
The German counter-terrorism database exemplifies a database with more than 
basic identifying information of subjects of an intelligence/domestic security agency that 
is electronically accessible by the portions of law enforcement entities working 
international terrorism matters in Germany.  This database is relatively new and there 
have not been any publicly reported significant successes associated with this database. 
D. TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS FOR XML SEGREGATION OF 
INFORMATION AND DISCOVERABILITY OF INFORMATION 
APPROACHES 
The XML Segregation of Information and Discoverability of Information 
approaches both require technology, including networks and software programs to 
prepare, securely store, effectively search and securely share appropriate information 
with all appropriate authorized users.  The XML Segregation of Information requires a 
more sophisticated computer system to facilitate the actual sharing of information and 
protect information stored in the system.  The Discoverability of Information approach 
requires a less sophisticated computer system with appropriate security and search 




Several current and developing computer systems have potential to perform the 
necessary functions for one or both of these approaches.  The German Counter Terrorism 
Database described above is already designed, implemented and performing the core 
functions of the Discoverability of Information approach.  The existing IDW system has 
the necessary security and robust search abilities.  It currently conducts full searches and 
returns the full content.  It may be possible to utilize a portal like the one in eGuardian to 
transfer information from the unclassified LEO network into the FBI Secret computer 
network; however, there currently is no capability to automatically return the results to 
the user back through a portal into the unclassified network.  The FBI intends to create 
the capacity to transfer unclassified information from the classified FBI Guardian system 
on the secret network to the unclassified eGuardian system, but this capacity does not 
currently exist (FBI, 2008, September 19).  Therefore, the current technological 
limitations require a manual review of the results by an authorized FBI user with access 
to the FBI Secret Network, who would then provide the permissible information to the 
outside user searching the system or at least provide a reference number (e.g., file and 
serial number of document).  This would be a labor-intensive system that would only 
automate the search function and still require the involvement of a FBI entity or unit like 
the TSC.  It may also be possible that an existing index of IDW and the IDW search 
capability could provide information identifying FBI document(s) (e.g., file and serial 
number) to allow for subsequent quick retrieval, review and sharing.   This IDW search 
capability could be easily deployed in classified systems like SIPRNET and HSDN.  
Many issues need to be resolved prior to deploying any IDW-related or similar system in 
an unclassified computer system and network. 
Of these systems, the most promising may be N-DEx, with inherent capabilities to 
perform the functions of both XML Segregation of Information and Discoverability of 
Information.  This system is still under development and expected to be deployed in the 
Fall of 2010.  N-DEx is currently intended for criminal intelligence, but the capabilities 
could either be expanded to address terrorism and homeland security information or as a 




homeland security information.  The following chart, from the FBI public Internet site, 
illustrates the intended functioning of N-DEx for criminal intelligence (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.   N-DEx Concept (From FBI, n.d. (j)) 
N-DEx can perform the necessary security access and restrict information in the 
following manners: 
Full Access (Green)–If the submitter of a data record (e.g., incident 
report, arrest report) has designated it to be fully shared, then all N-DEx 
users with the appropriate access authority will have access to the full 
record and all data elements within the record. 
Pointer-Based Access (Yellow)–If the data submitter decides that access 
to a specific record, or specific data elements, should be restricted except 




record accordingly using pointer-based sharing. With pointer-based 
sharing, any user that gets a “hit,” or attempts access to a record with this 
designation, will be provided with information on how to contact the 
designated record submitter (i.e., the POC for the record) only. It is then 
the responsibility of the data requestor to contact the data submitter who 
will determine whether the record can be shared. If so, N-DEx provides 
mechanisms so that the data submitter can make accessible that 
information to a specific user or group of users as applicable. 
Restricted Access (Red)–There will be circumstances where a data record 
or part of the record is so highly sensitive that the data contributer [sp] 
completely restricts access to it and to any knowledge of that record to a 
selected user or user group. The value of having the record in N-DEx is 
that the data submitter can benefit from correlations made with other N-
DEx records without compromising the information contained in the 
sensitive record. With restricted access, any "hits" against the restricted 
record will be known to the submitter user/group while the submitter of 
the other record that it hit against will have no knowledge of the 
correlation. (FBI, 2007, January, Section 1(C)) 
The most significant obstacle to utilizing N-DEx for either of these approaches 
will be handling the classified information, which cannot be stored in an unclassified 
system.  Therefore, some ability to identify this information with at least a pointer system 
would be critical for deploying an effective system.  These issues will be examined in 
greater detail in the Chapter VI analysis of these approaches and systems. 
Finally, these existing and developing systems could provide the foundation for 
creating an entirely new system to realize the requirements for the XML Segregation of 
Information or Discoverability of Information approaches in classified, unclassified or 
both environments.  The FBI prefers to use these systems or other existing commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) alternatives with minor modifications compared to creating a new 
computer system.  Additional detailed, operational capabilities and functions of the 
system or network are not necessary for the analysis of these options, and could be 








VI. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SHARING POLICY OPTIONS 
This thesis analyzes the current FBI information sharing “status quo” and the 
following three policy and technology options:  a new homeland security “routine use” 
exception, a Discoverability of Information approach, and a XML Segregation of 
Information approach.  This analysis will be conducted in two phases.  The first phase 
examines the effectiveness of the approaches by rating them on the effectiveness factor 
criteria for information shared, privacy protection and security.  The second phase 
examines the implementation of these approaches by rating the following four 
implementation factors:  cultural resistance, fiscal performance, utilization of technology 
and training requirements.   
A. EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION ANALYSIS 
1. Information Shared 
a. Relevance 
The “status quo” and proposed homeland security “routine use” exception 
approaches both rely on existing “ad hoc” methods of information sharing, as detailed in 
Chapter IV.  They both depend on the FBI to identify terrorism and homeland security 
information relevant to a particular agency.  Once the relevant information is identified, it 
can be manually shared through the existing mechanisms with the appropriate outside 
agency personnel.  An outside agency can request relevant information from the FBI 
through an RFI or informal “ad hoc” relationships, but the requestor is completely 
dependent on the FBI user’s ability to find the relevant information and determine that the 
information can be shared with the requesting outside agency.  The requesting agency may 
or may not know that there is actually relevant or potentially relevant information in the 
possession of the FBI that is withheld, or the reason(s) for withholding that information. 
The new homeland security “routine use” exception allows the sharing of 




exceptions for criminal, civil and regulatory violations.  The expanded scope of 
permissible PII sharing enables the new homeland security “routine use” approach to 
share a greater amount of relevant information with SLT homeland security agencies.  
There will not be a corresponding increase in irrelevant material, since the overall 
information reviewed for sharing will be the same as the “status quo” approach.  The 
homeland security “routine use” exception ensures that all relevant terrorism and 
homeland security information can be shared as long as it is related to an investigation 
with some level of predication (i.e., suspicion or allegation of a terrorism threat).  The 
only option permitting greater sharing of relevant terrorism and homeland security 
information is the previously discussed CIA “routine use” exception that permits the 
sharing of relevant information solely at the discretion of the CIA. 
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches are technological solutions with substantial similarities.  These two 
approaches allow the outside agency direct access to FBI information through a network, 
database or other technological solution.  The outside agency is not dependent upon an 
FBI user to search FBI systems for relevant information.  Instead, the outside user 
conducts searches of the available FBI terrorism and homeland security information to 
identify information that may be relevant to their investigation or threat.  Both of these 
systems can restrict information for operational, security or legal reasons.  The systems 
should either advise the outside agency that information is being withheld or notify the 
appropriate FBI of the search by the outside agency to ensure that even restricted relevant 
information is reviewed on a case-by-case basis for sharing with outside agencies.   
The Discoverability of Information approach is a pointer system that 
provides a reference number (e.g., the FBI case number and serial of particular 
document[s]) for potentially relevant terrorism and homeland security information in the 
FBI system.  The inability to review the actual information on a real-time basis increases 
the possibility of missing relevant information or requesting irrelevant information, 
which significantly reduces the potential for the Discoverability of Information approach 
to locate relevant and eliminate irrelevant information compared to the XML Segregation 




The XML Segregation of Information approach segregates the relevant 
and irrelevant information, facilitating maximum sharing of relevant information to each 
recipient.  The capability to conduct real-time searches and immediately review the 
maximum amount of potentially relevant information maximizes the ability of the outside 
agency to identify and access relevant information, while excluding or ignoring the 
maximum amount of irrelevant information.  The security level of the system, laws and 
policies may limit access to this information, which requires the outside agency to use 
existing “ad hoc” methods with the reference information provided by the system.  The 
XML Segregation of Information approach would provide the maximum capability of 
searching new FBI terrorism and homeland security information outside existing FBI 
computer systems, only limited by Privacy Act and security issues.  
A significant limitation in the short term for the XML Segregation of 
Information will be handling the historical FBI terrorism and homeland security 
information.  Since NER technology is not suitable to automatically convert the historical 
information into XML, the FBI will either have to conduct a manual review to tag this 
information or implement an index or “pointer system” like the proposed Discovery of 
Information approach for historical FBI terrorism and homeland security information.   
These two technological approaches are currently limited to sharing 
relevant terrorism and homeland security information related to criminal, civil or 
regulatory enforcement by the “status quo” Privacy Act “routine use” exceptions.  The 
AGG-DOM authorizes the FBI to conduct terrorism investigations of threats to national 
security regardless of evidence of criminal activity, as long as the investigation is not 
exclusively based on constitutionally protected behavior or profiling.  A liberal 
interpretation of the current “routine use” exception may allow for sharing a great deal of 
terrorism and homeland security information, but there is still a reasonable risk that 
relevant information will be withheld, based on the variety of interpretations of this 
exception.  Therefore, these two exceptions can only share the same amount of relevant 
information permitted under the “status quo,” since neither of these approaches 




This analysis resulted in the following ratings (Table 6) for the relevance 
criteria, utilizing the descriptions provided in Chapter III. 












Relevance  Medium High  Medium  Medium 
 
b. Accuracy 
The “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception 
approaches are both dependent on the current manual communication methods for 
accuracy.  The manual sharing process, even if the actual method of communication is 
technology like e-mail or telephone, creates certain inherent problems regarding accurate 
communication for all methods of human communication.  The interpretation of the FBI 
employee or TFO providing the information could influence the accurate understanding 
of the information by the recipient.  In some circumstances, it would be possible to 
provide a physical copy of the original information, which would significantly reduce—
but not eliminate—accuracy issues.  The manual sharing process also limits the ability of 
the recipient to easily obtain updated information to ensure access to the most updated 
accurate information.  Ultimately, these two methods are subject to the inherent accuracy 
issues involved with manual sharing and communication between human beings and 
organizations.  However, the new homeland security “routine use” exception has a 
greater potential to communicate the most accurate information, since it allows sharing of 
more relevant terrorism and homeland security information compared with the “status 
quo” exceptions’ more limited capacity to share PII related to criminal, civil and 
regulatory violations. 
The Discoverability of Information approach does not provide the actual 




communication.  The XML Segregation of Information approach enables the greatest 
level of accuracy with its immediate access to the maximum amount of permissible FBI 
information for the outside agency.  This ability to review the actual information 
significantly reduces the detrimental impact of inherent accuracy issues in human and 
organizational communication.  There may still be information unavailable directly 
through the system due to classification or other restrictions.  The sharing of this 
unavailable information will have the same inherent accuracy issues in all three other 
approaches.  Finally, the ability to easily and quickly obtain new relevant information 
significantly reduces any negative impact on accuracy caused by additional information 
that clarifies, modifies or augments understanding the original information that is 
subsequently added to the system. 
The analysis above resulted in the following ratings for these four 
approaches (Table 7). 












Accuracy  Medium High  Medium  High 
 
c. Timeliness 
The “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception 
approaches are significantly limited in their timeliness by the manual information sharing 
methods.  These approaches require a FBI user to manually search FBI systems for all 
relevant information required by the outside agency.  These approaches also require a 
manual process to securely communicate information to the outside agency, which 
produces an additional delay in the information sharing process.  This dependence on 
manual processes of searching and sharing means the timeliness is limited by the 




taking place during regular business hours.  The FBI could remedy this predicament with 
additional personnel assigned to access the terrorism and homeland security information 
beyond regular business hours. 
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches both provide immediate, real-time access to a computer system that enables 
the user to search for relevant information at any time.  This real-time search capability 
for the Discoverability of Information approach is a significant improvement, since 
technology can maximize time saving associated with the initial communication and 
search function required for the “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” 
exception approaches.  The Discoverability of Information approach still requires the 
existing manual information sharing processes, which creates the same timeliness issues 
as the “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception approaches.  The 
XML Segregation of Information approach eliminates all timeliness concerns for 
information available through the electronic system, except for historical documents that 
require employing the “status quo” approach, the Discoverability of Information 
approach or an enormous commitment of resources to transform existing information into 
a suitable XML format.  The information restricted in the system for all approaches 
would still be subject to the timeliness limitations of the existing manual information 
sharing processes  
The analysis above resulted in the following ratings for these four 
approaches (Table 8). 
















2. Privacy Protection 
a. Public Perceptions 
The FBI “status quo” approach was rated as medium, since these systems 
have already been implemented, or are in the process of being implemented, by the FBI.  
The public and privacy advocates are fully aware of these systems and approaches.  They 
have had sufficient opportunity to raise concerns to influence public perception of these 
approaches.  Considering their history of attacking systems early in the process to prevent 
their continued development or deployment, the public and privacy advocates have either 
elected not to attack these “status quo” systems, or have failed in their efforts.  Both TIA 
and CAPS II experienced attacks early in their creation, which ultimately led to a 
negative public perception and detrimental impact on funding.  It is still possible there 
could be a change of the public perception of the “status quo” systems and approach; 
however, it is impossible to predict the likelihood of these situations.  Overall, the current 
FBI “status quo” approaches and systems have not created the heightened level of public 
concern associated with the negative public perceptions of TIA and CAPS II. 
The requirement to publish Privacy Act notices in the Federal Register for 
all of the new approaches, and to create and publish PIAs, ensures that the public and 
privacy advocates will have significant details regarding these new approaches and 
systems.  Therefore, the other two effectiveness evaluation criteria for privacy protection 
will have a significant impact on public perception.  The complexity and unpredictability 
of the factors and circumstances surrounding public perception make it nearly impossible 
to accurately predict the probability of both a negative public perception and detrimental 
action being taken against the approaches and systems.   
The new homeland security “routine use” exception is unlikely to 
outperform the existing “status quo” approach in the public perception evaluation factor, 
since it seeks to expand information sharing without any corresponding improvement in 
control or accountability to enhance privacy protection.  Therefore, the new homeland 
security “routine use” exception would likely achieve either a medium or low rating for 




perceived terrorism threat and invasion of privacy, will be the greatest factors influencing 
public perception.  These circumstances cannot be predicted prior to the public proposal 
of the system and they can substantially change during the development or deployment of 
this approach.  The CIA Privacy Act example reported by the Markle Foundation Task 
Force demonstrates that the FBI could commit to the new homeland security “routine 
use” exception regardless of public and political opposition, which would significantly 
reduce the criticality of this factor.   
The two technological approaches are likely to be highly susceptible to the 
impact of public perception, since they will require funding and authorization from 
political officials outside the FBI.  The funding for both TIA and CAPS II were 
terminated by outside political and public pressure, while the FBI’s IDW system survived 
similar attacks and scrutiny.  The FBI success developing and implementing systems like 
IDW and eGuardian indicate there may be some factors specific to the FBI or its method 
of implementation that enhances their ability to mitigate or overcome potential negative 
public perception associated with systems or approaches that may have a negative impact 
on privacy.  The FBI could mitigate this issue by utilizing less expensive or existing 
systems with only minimal modifications, which would expedite the process of 
implementation and reduce impact of Congressional inquiries in response to negative 
public perceptions. 
The inherent complexity of assessing future public perception, and the 
ability of public perception to change during the process of developing, deploying and 
operating an information sharing system, makes it impossible to accurately predict public 
perception for a proposed approach and system.  The subsequent effectiveness evaluation 
privacy protection factor criteria are likely to have an impact on public perception, which 
ensures consideration of privacy protection issues in systems or approaches despite the 
limitation in ability to accurately predict or evaluate public perceptions.   
b. Privacy Act Compliance 
The “status quo” and the new homeland security “routine use” exception 




ensures compliance with these laws, policies and procedures through existing standard 
management approaches and documentation.  Auditing of information sharing for these 
approaches requires a manual review of the physical and electronic forms documenting 
information sharing.  The current task force environments encourage the substantial 
informal exchange of information, which further complicates the existing manual review 
and audit processes.  This considerable dependence on individuals creates significant 
potential for individual users to share information in violation of policies, while 
circumventing existing review processes.  Auditing all access of authorized FBI users to 
information to ensure compliance with information sharing policies is significantly 
complicated by their legitimate need to access the information, the volume of information 
maintained by the FBI and the substantial burden of auditing all access to information.  
Overall, the oversight and auditing of this manual information sharing process is one of 
many oversight functions performed by FBI management.  This is a risk inherent with 
granting access to information through any information technology system. 
As previously discussed, the FBI currently shares terrorism and homeland 
security PII with outside agencies when it establishes a violation of law, regulation, rule, 
order or contract.  This exception clearly permits the sharing of relevant terrorism and 
homeland security information that relates to an act of terrorism or criminal act in support 
of terrorism; however, it is less clear when applied to FBI terrorism intelligence 
investigations without evidence of a criminal act.  The lack of a criminal offense is never 
an issue when examining failures related to an actual or attempted terrorist attack, like the 
9/11 attacks or the attack by Major Hassan on Fort Hood in 2009, since all retrospective 
examinations of successful terrorist attacks or attempts necessarily have a definitive 
criminal violation that would allow PII sharing.  Unfortunately, the “ad hoc” method 
requires the FBI information holder to prospectively make this judgment with limited 
information, which creates potential for inconsistent sharing or withholding of otherwise 
relevant information based on erroneous or flawed interpretation and understanding of all 
the facts of the particular case or the limitations of the FBI Privacy Act policies and 
procedures.  The new homeland security “routine use” exception authorizes sharing 




the FBI have sufficient information indicating the information sharing is necessary to 
assist another agency investigating a homeland security threat or investigation to resolve 
that threat or investigation and the shared PII relates to an individual(s), who may be a 
homeland security or terrorism-related threat or target.  Therefore, this new homeland 
security “routine use” exception permits greater sharing of relevant terrorism and 
homeland security information, while reducing confusion that could contribute to 
inconsistent and ineffective terrorism and homeland security information sharing. 
The new homeland security “routine use” exception approach is designed 
to strictly comply with all Privacy Act requirements.  The significant expansion of 
permissible information sharing for terrorism and homeland security information reduces 
the potential for Privacy Act violations, which reduces the impact of the less robust 
system for oversight, control and auditing of the information shared with outside 
agencies.  This expanded permissible sharing should also reduce the individual FBI 
employee or TFO temptation to violate the Privacy Act or FBI policies over concerns or 
motivations beyond the scope or in conflict with these restrictions.  
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches both have the capacity for robust immutable logging of access to FBI 
information.  User agreements and MOUs would officially inhibit the user and agency 
from inappropriately accessing the information.  This audit trail enables the FBI to 
monitor access to information for indications of unauthorized use of the system or 
information.  This audit trail enables the FBI to more effectively investigate and remedy 
Privacy Act and other violations.  The Discoverability of Information approach should 
employ an automated process of requesting and documenting information sharing to 
enhance the audit capability of the system.  The XML Segregation of Information 
approach provides the highest level of compliance with the Privacy Act, since it 
significantly reduces the individual FBI user role in the decision to share information, 
while maintaining the most robust audit trail of the information sought, reviewed and 
shared by each individual user and agency.  All of these approaches require or may 
require some manual sharing, which creates at least some potential for Privacy Act 




consistent with the “status quo” approach with its dependence on the judgment and 
execution by the individual FBI employee or TFO.   
The above analysis resulted in the following ratings for these four 
approaches (Table 9). 












Privacy Act Compliance  Medium Medium  Medium  High 
 
c. Privacy Impact Assessment 
The following PIA Section 5 was created for the current FBI “status quo” 
approaches to information sharing: 
Section 5.0 External Sharing and Disclosure  
The following questions are intended to define the content, scope, 
and authority for information sharing external to DOJ, which 
includes foreign, federal, state and local government, and the 
private sector. 
5.1 With which external (non-DOJ) recipient(s) is the 
information shared? 
The information is shared with all federal, state, local and tribal 
agencies with a “need to know” the information that meets a 
current FBI blanket “routine use” exceptions or other lawful basis 
to receive the information. 
5.2 What information is shared and for what purpose?  
The current “status quo” shares information that establishes a 
violation of law, regulation, rule, order or contract.  The 
information may be disclosed to the entity responsible for its 




5.3 How is the information transmitted or disclosed?  
The information can be transmitted or disclosed in person, through 
a secure computer network, in a document or through any other 
reliable existing or future authorized communication means.   
5.4 Are there any agreements concerning the security and 
privacy of the data once it is shared? 
There are not any agreements concerning the security or the 
privacy of the data, except for the rules for whatever system or 
method is used to share the information.  This information is still 
restricted by the Privacy Act after it is shared with the recipient 
agency.  The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by the 
FBI and all participant agencies governs the information shared 
through the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to Task Force 
Officers (TFOs).  This MOA makes all the TFOs subject to the 
laws, regulations, guidelines and policies applicable to the FBI. 
5.5 What type of training is required for users from 
agencies outside DOJ prior to receiving access to the 
information?  
There would not be any specific training for users outside DOJ that 
would get access to the terrorism and homeland security 
information, except the training for the mechanism utilized for the 
actual sharing of the information.  The JTTF TFOs are trained by 
the FBI as part of their role on the JTTF. 
5.6 Are there any provisions in place for auditing the 
recipients’ use of the information?  
There are no inherent auditing mechanisms for use of the 
information.  Existing system and policy auditing systems in the 
mechanism or policy actually utilized for sharing information will 
vary according to the system.  The JTTF TFOs are supervised by a 
FBI Supervisor and other management and subject to existing 





5.7 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the external sharing, 
what privacy risks were identified and describe how they were 
mitigated.  
The greatest privacy risks are the risks inherent with all homeland 
security information sharing, including the possibility that the 
information will be misunderstood or misinterpreted.  Since this is 
not a computer system, there are no mechanisms inherent in this 
approach to minimize the further dissemination or utilization of the 
shared terrorism or homeland security information.  Ultimately all 
sharing of terrorism and homeland security information requires 
trust in the recipient to understand and appropriately handle and 
use the information. 
This PIA does not adequately address any sections other than sections 5.1 and 5.2.  The 
PIA illustrates the lack of control and auditing in the current manual “ad hoc” 
information sharing mechanisms addressed in greater detail in earlier sections of this 
thesis.  The PIA for the new homeland security “routine use” exception was identical to 
the “status quo” PIA except for Section 5.2:   
5.2 What information is shared and for what purpose?  
This approach will share appropriate terrorism and homeland 
security with federal, state, local and tribal agencies with a need 
for this information to perform their homeland security missions. 
The proposed new homeland security “routine use” exception PIA suffers 
from the same deficiencies as the “status quo” approaches PIA due its reliance on the existing 
manual “ad hoc” information sharing mechanisms.  Section 5.2 only addresses the expanded 
permissible terrorism and homeland security information sharing in this approach.  
The following PIA Section 5 was created for the Discoverability of 
Information approach: 
Section 5.0 External Sharing and Disclosure  
The following questions are intended to define the content, scope, 
and authority for information sharing external to DOJ, which 
includes foreign, federal, state and local government, and the 




5.1  With which external (non-DOJ) recipient(s) is the 
information shared?   
The information will be shared with all federal, state, local and 
tribal homeland security agencies with a need to know the 
information to perform their homeland security mission. 
5.2  What information is shared and for what purpose?  
An index of all entities associated with FBI homeland security and 
terrorism investigations searchable by authorized users of the 
system will be shared in this system.  
5.3  How is the information transmitted or disclosed?  
The information will be accessible through a secure network, like 
N-DEx, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), RISSNET or a new VPN 
system.  The system will only confirm and provide location 
information for potential homeland security information related to 
the particular entity.  The user will be required to utilize existing 
“ad hoc” relationships and mechanisms to actually obtain the 
underlying information or determine that the information is not 
suitable for sharing.    
5.4  Are there any agreements concerning the security and 
privacy of the data once it is shared?    
This system requires a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
like other computer systems, and is governed by a user’s 
agreement.  These would be the standard agreements utilized for 
other Department of Justice and FBI systems to ensure security and 
privacy protection. 
5.5  What type of training is required for users from 
agencies outside DOJ prior to receiving access to the 
information?  
A computer based training system would be required for all users 





5.6  Are there any provisions in place for auditing the 
recipients’ use of the information?  
There will be robust auditing of the access with logs and 
enforcement of violations of system rules.  However, sharing 
terrorism and homeland security information will be conducted 
pursuant to the existing or future “ad hoc” systems and policies, 
and will be governed by auditing systems and rules of that system 
or policy. 
5.7  Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the external sharing, 
what privacy risks were identified and describe how they were 
mitigated.  
The most significant privacy risks are misuse of the system or 
information from the system. FBI auditing of usage should 
mitigate unauthorized or inappropriate uses of the system; 
however, it will be subject to the same limitations as any other 
government computer systems.  There is a greater risk of misuse 
created by the greater number of users, including users not 
employed or directly managed by the federal government, 
Department of Justice or the FBI.   
An authorized user will be able to conduct searches of FBI 
terrorism and homeland security information to determine if an 
individual, location or other entity is in the system.  The individual 
will be directed to contact the appropriate entity within the FBI to 
determine the nature of this “positive hit.”  It will be possible to 
distinguish subjects of pending cases to indicate a possible nexus 
to terrorism.  However, it will be clear that all other “positive hits” 
may not have any nexus to terrorism.  The system will emphasize 
not taking any action based on the search results or lack of positive 
search results.  The system will not allow for the surfing of 
information by the user, which will mitigate the potential privacy 
impact.   
Once the information is provided to the authorized user(s), after 
being identified through the system, then the handling of it will be 
governed by current or future “ad hoc” systems and policies.  The 
existing “ad hoc” systems and policies do not have robust systems 
for ensuring proper usage of the information, but this deficiency 




The XML Segregation of Information PIA was identical to the 
Discoverability of Information PIA, except for Sections 5.2, 5.3 and portions of 5.7: 
5.2  What information is shared and for what purpose?  
This system will identify and segregate all different types of FBI 
terrorism and homeland security information contained in the FBI 
case management system.  The type of information shared is 
limited according to the sensitivity of the information, the legal 
authority for the recipient to get the information, security clearance 
level of the system, security clearance of recipient and the need for 
the recipient to have the information to perform their homeland 
security mission.  The information that does not meet this standard 
is not available to the user or in the system.   
5.3  How is the information transmitted or disclosed?  
The information is transmitted through a variety of secure 
networks or electronic media, including classified and controlled 
unclassified information systems. The information will be 
accessible through a secure network, like N-DEx, Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO), RISSNET or a new VPN system.  The 
information will also be accessible through classified systems like 
Department of Defense's (DoD) Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNET) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS) connected to FBI classified 
networks. 
5.7  Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the external sharing, 
what privacy risks were identified and describe how they were 
mitigated.  
The most significant privacy risks are misuse of the system or 
information from the system.  FBI auditing of usage should 
mitigate unauthorized or inappropriate uses of the system; 
however, it will be subject to the same limitations as any other 
government computer systems.  There is a greater risk of misuse 
created by the greater number of users, including users not 
employed or directly managed by the federal government, 
Department of Justice or the FBI.  
The information provided through the system will be provided to 




purposes.  The user will not be authorized to take action based on 
the information or further disseminate the information without the 
written permission of the FBI.  There will be robust auditing and 
enforcement measures to address violations of these restrictions 
similar to the enforcement mechanisms created and being 
implemented for the criminal information sharing system N-DEx. 
Both PIAs provide detailed information for every section of the PIA.  They sufficiently 
address all sub-sections and provide a thorough understanding of the critical aspects of 
these approaches, including robust means to protect the information and audit access to 
the information. 
Analysis of these PIAs resulted in the following ratings for the four 
approaches (Table 10). 













Assessment  Low  Low  High  High 
 
3. Security 
a. Handling of Sensitive and Classified Information 
The current “status quo” and the new homeland security “routine use” 
exception approaches are both manual approaches completely dependent on individual 
users of FBI systems.  The FBI ensures the appropriate vetting of all users of FBI 
systems, including user understanding and compliance with security restrictions designed 
to protect sensitive and classified information.  The FBI case management systems, ACS 
and Sentinel, protect all information to the highest classification level, which is the Secret 




security requirements for handling and storing classified information.  This high level of 
security is detrimental to information portability and sharing.     
The Discoverability of Information approach is a technological solution 
that will not contain the actual classified or sensitive information in an immediately 
usable manner.  If the name of the entity itself is classified, then it would be restricted 
within the system as a “silent hit” or never entered into the system to ensure the security 
of the classified information.  Potentially relevant information identified through this 
system will have a reference number, which can be utilized with existing “ad hoc” 
manual information sharing approaches to complete the sharing process.  If the 
underlying information is classified or sensitive, then the FBI must comply with the 
necessary USIC and FBI requirements to share or withhold the information.  This 
approach has the same limitations and vulnerabilities discussed for the “status quo” 
approach. 
The XML Segregation of Information approach removes or anonymizes 
classified and sensitive information before providing it to an authorized agency or 
system.  This enables the FBI to remove classified information from documents that are 
shared in systems like N-DEx that are not authorized for classified information, while 
retaining the classified information for classified networks like SIPRNET or HSDN.  
This capability could also protect other sensitive information; like grand jury information, 
tax information, FISA material, information from foreign governments, information from 
other agencies, information obtained pursuant to other federal statutes and other sensitive 
information.  This approach ensures FBI compliance with all restrictions on all types of 
classified and sensitive information, while maximizing information sharing.  The FBI 
could also protect entire document(s) or portions of documents for a limited time period 
or from particular recipient(s).  This segregation of the different types of information 
gives the FBI the greatest flexibility to secure and share all types of information to the 
appropriate users or groups of users without revealing unnecessary or inappropriate 
classified or sensitive information.  The classified information removed or anonymized 
from documents shared in an unclassified system could still be shared through the 




HSDN, since the classified information can only be stored, transmitted or retrieved from 
an authorized classified network in an authorized facility.  The manual sharing process 
for classified and historical FBI terrorism and homeland security information creates the 
same potential risks of inappropriate disclosures of classified or sensitive information as 
the other three approaches.  This XML approach facilitates attainment of the FBI NISS 
guiding principle to  “[p]roduce documents at the lowest classification level feasible 
without losing meaning or essential context while protecting sources and vital national 
security information” (FBI, 2008, ¶ 6). 
Analysis of the handling of classified and sensitive information in all four 
approaches resulted in the following ratings (Table 11). 












Sensitive/Classified Info  Medium Medium  Medium  High 
 
b. Access Control 
The “status quo” and the new homeland security “routine use” exception 
approaches are both manual “ad hoc” processes that do not have technological access 
control systems.  The FBI case management systems store the majority of the terrorism 
and homeland security information, and both have robust access control systems. The 
Secret classification level for these systems prevents them from being physically 
connected to unclassified networks like the Internet or unclassified government networks, 
which significantly reduces the threat of unauthorized access by an outsider.  All 
information systems are susceptible to the insider threat, which can ultimately result in an 
authorized user conducting unauthorized dissemination of the information.  These 
systems do not handle the mechanism for information sharing, but their access control 
systems limit access to the information to a large group of authorized FBI system users.  




information exercising individual control over access to the information.  These two 
approaches are dependant on authorized FBI users to determine the “who, what, where 
and when” of all information sharing.  This distributed control creates greater 
vulnerability for mistakes and inconsistent application of the rules, which can create a 
corresponding increased risk of unauthorized access or inappropriate denial of access to 
information. 
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches both provide significant access control through automated systems.  These 
systems employ the same technology utilized by numerous other government and private 
computer systems.  No system can prevent all unauthorized access or ensure everyone 
with authorized access is always able to access the system and all appropriate 
information.  These two approaches enable the greatest possible access control offered by 
current and future security technologies.  There is risk of unauthorized access to specific 
information in the Discoverability of Information due to its reliance on current “ad hoc” 
mechanisms to communicate or withhold requested information identified in this system.  
However, this approach creates a more robust and reliable record of access, which will be 
addressed in greater detail in the following section on compliance and audit capabilities.  
XML Segregation of Information provides the greatest level of access control permitted 
by the available technology deployed in the system, but the storage of any FBI 
information in a system outside the FBI Secret network creates a greater vulnerability in 
access control and other security issues. 
Analysis of the access control resulted in the following ratings of these 
four approaches (Table 12). 

















c. Compliance and Audits 
The “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception 
approaches are manual methods primarily relying on manual auditing processes to ensure 
compliance.  The first level of review and potential auditing in FBI information 
management and sharing is the FBI first line supervisor, who has the authority to approve 
a document and authorize information sharing to ensure it is in compliance with all FBI 
policies and procedures.  Records of information sharing are maintained in FBI case 
management systems for review by FBI and DOJ-OIG personnel in future audits.  These 
audits are completely dependant on the quality of the information reported in FBI case 
management systems.  Manual systems also provide a greater opportunity for individuals 
to circumvent the authorized information sharing processes with informal information 
sharing that is not properly documented.  Manual audits are manpower intensive and do 
not take place contemporaneously with the actual sharing of the information.  Finally, 
there is a risk of misuse of information due to inadequate training.  This manual process 
is entirely dependant on the performance of the FBI employees, who receive, share, 
supervise and audit the information sharing. 
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
leverage current technological approaches to review the sharing and withholding of 
information in a timey manner with robust auditing to ensure maximum compliance by 
the recipient and the FBI.  Access to information logs can be stored in immutable logs, 
which are a secure method to protect logs from easy tampering by authorized or 
unauthorized users.  The electronic storage of information about the actual information 
shared and recipient allows for compliance reviews to be conducted in a timelier manner 
to prevent delays in information sharing, while maintaining robust records allowing for 
effective comprehensive audits.  These logs permit more frequent, remote audits of 
sharing or withholding information.   
This audit capability would allow FBI management to more effectively 
review both the sharing and withholding of terrorism and homeland security information.  




overruling the original decision to withhold information and immediately sharing the 
information.  The timely discovery of information sharing deficiencies allows FBI 
management to immediately provide remedial training or take other actions to ensure 
improved compliance with all FBI information sharing rules and procedures.  Immediate 
feedback to FBI users inappropriate failures to share information has the potential to 
improve the overall FBI information sharing effort.  Review and auditing could also be 
employed to motivate FBI users and ensure improved compliance by clearly 
communicating the nature and scope of audits and consequences for failings or repeated 
failings.   For example, a FBI user aware that refusals to share information or restricting 
information leads to an enhanced review process or increased likelihood of an audit is 
likely to be encouraged to increase their information sharing, which could counter current 
and future cultural, legal or other incentives to withhold information.  This capacity could 
also ensure the protection of highly sensitive information by auditing the sharing of 
certain types of information.  This auditing capacity and the end user’s agreement 
(EULA) provide the FBI an opportunity to enforce information recipient violations of the 
policies and procedures.  Resources dedicated to auditing and system rules in the MOU 
will define this capacity and provide the authority to investigate information recipient 
violations.  The audit trail will be invaluable evidence to identify and substantiate 
violations through formalized internal processes or informally with the management of 
non-FBI users suspected of rules violations.  The N-DEx system already has some 
capacity and authority for this type of auditing and enforcement actions with criminal 
intelligence from their computer system. 
The analysis of the audit capacity and compliance capability of these four 
approaches resulted in the following ratings (Table 13). 

















B. IMPLEMENTATION FACTORS ANALYSIS 
The second phase of the analysis examines the critical factors impacting the 
implementation of these approaches.  This analysis is unnecessary for any system that 
fails on any of the implementation factors.  Based on the assumption that “unknown” 
public perception will be met for all of these approaches, the thesis continues with the 
implementation analysis of all approaches in the following sections. 
1. Cultural Barriers8 
The FBI currently engages in extensive information sharing consistent with or 
integrated over the past few years into FBI culture.  FBI employee resistance to sharing 
has been mitigated by FBI policies, training and efforts over the years since 9/11.  The 
ability of individual FBI employees to unilaterally inhibit information sharing persists, 
which maintains some potential for cultural resistance in any particular instance or by an 
individual employee.  The incorporation or mitigation of FBI cultural resistance into 
current FBI information sharing means the “status quo” approach does not face 
significant additional cultural resistance.  It is impossible to precisely quantify the level 
of FBI cultural resistance, but expanded information sharing since 9/11 by FBI personnel 
illustrates at least some significant reduction in cultural resistance after 9/11.  The 
expansion of permissible information sharing with the new homeland security “routine 
use” exception is also likely to be easily integrated into existing FBI culture to the same 
extent and manner as the “status quo” approach.  The new homeland security “routine 
use” exception approach uses terms and standards familiar to FBI employees from the 
new AGG-DOM that govern all FBI investigations.  These rules have governed FBI 
investigations and operations since October of 2008, which substantially reduces the 
likelihood of confusion and cultural resistance caused by introducing a new approach 
with unfamiliar rules and terms.  However, expansion of the amount of information 
shared could create additional cultural resistance, since change can cause concerns that 
                                                 
8 The author of this thesis relied upon personal experience in the FBI Boston Field Office for the past 




may manifest themselves as cultural resistance.  The new homeland security “routine 
use” exception approach does not employ any technology to mitigate possible FBI 
cultural resistance.  This new homeland security “routine use” exception is consistent 
with the FBI NISS and DNI mandate to create a culture of a “duty to provide.”  
Unfortunately, there is no objective, reliable reporting to indicate whether this “duty to 
provide” has already been successfully integrated into the USIC or FBI cultures.  
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information both 
have significant potential for FBI cultural resistance.  The FBI has experienced numerous 
technological changes over the years with computer systems like VCF, Sentinel, Delta, 
IDW and others.9  The FBI has also gone through extensive changes involving the re-
alignment of resources within the FBI, new Attorney General Guidelines, a new 
Domestic Investigative Operations Guidelines (DIOG), the Strategic Execution Team 
(SET) process, creation of a Directorate of Intelligence, creation of the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) Directorate, and countless other significant, substantive changes 
precipitated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. government transformation in 
response to these attacks.  The years of constant, substantial change have created an 
environment with significant potential for cultural resistance resulting from the 
implementation of a considerable volume of new technologies and policies.  Therefore, it 
is probable that there will be some cultural resistance to any additional technology and 
policy changes.   
Despite this significant potential for cultural resistance, both of these 
technological systems use technology to automate the process, which should significantly 
reduce the immediate burden and limit the potential negative impact on FBI employees.  
The Discoverability of Information approach could face resistance from FBI employees 
called upon to respond to increased requests for highly sensitive, investigative 
information from individuals outside the FBI from FBI employees or TFOs with 
responsibility for the investigation or collection of the information.  The XML 
Segregation of Information approach should not face this obstacle as frequently as the 
                                                 
9 VCF, Sentinel and IDW were examined in greater detail in earlier sections of this thesis.  Delta is the 




Discoverability of Information approach, since a significant amount of the information 
will be directly available from the system without direct FBI employee involvement.  
This reduced involvement of individual FBI employee with an interest in the case and 
information should reduce cultural resistance from FBI employees.  There is still 
potential for individual FBI employees to express their resistance through the over-
classification, inappropriate labeling of sensitive information or other behavior intended 
to inhibit information sharing through an informal method, which could reduce the 
amount of information shared beyond the FBI.  However, this can be addressed through 
effective policies, supervision, robust auditing and appropriate enforcement of the rules 
designed to ensure the implementation of the DNI “duty to share” standard.  The FBI has 
been navigating all of these technological changes in the middle of sweeping 
organizational changes, which has created concerns of “change fatigue” in the FBI. 
It is extremely difficult to assess and rate the likely cultural barriers and resistance 
to these approaches in the FBI.  Despite the inherent difficulties of conducting this analysis, 
the following ratings were made based on the best possible assessment of the FBI cultural 
barriers and technological solutions that might mitigate these issues (Table 14). 












Cultural Barriers  Medium Medium  Medium  Medium 
 
2. Fiscal Performance 
The “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception approaches 
are both manual systems that do not require substantial additional financial expenditures.  
The costs associated with the technologies and methods used in the “status quo” approach 
have already been expended or will be expended for purposes other than these 




have minimal additional expenses beyond those in the “status quo” approach.  There 
would be nominal expenses associated with finalizing the homeland security “routine 
use” exception, like getting DOJ approval, publishing it in the Federal Register, 
reviewing public comments, submitting it to OMB, training FBI personnel on the new 
rules and other miscellaneous expenses.  The greatest expense for these two approaches is 
the continuing cost of devoting significant personnel resources to the manual process of 
searching and sharing information, rather than an automated, technological approach that 
would ameliorate some of these costs in the future.   
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches both require significant financial expenditures for a new computer system or 
utilization of an existing system capable of performing all necessary functions, like N-
DEx.  The Discoverability of Information only requires a computer system as complex as 
Guardian.  The limited requirements for these approaches should prevent the costs of the 
system from rising anywhere near the level of a case management system like Sentinel.  
The Discoverability of Information approach would only provide minimal savings of 
personnel expenses associated with the current “status quo” information sharing 
approach, since the actual sharing of information is not automated.   
An essential expense for the XML Segregation of Information approach is the 
creation of numerous new XML forms capable of segregating the different types of 
classified and sensitive information collected and maintained by the FBI.  The NER 
technology, discussed in Chapter V, does not allow for the reliable automatic creation of 
XML documents with all the classified and sensitive information segregated from the 
existing data or new free-form documents.  Sentinel XML documents created by the FBI 
have already cost $810,000, but are currently undergoing modifications to meet FBI 
operational requirements (DOJ-OIG, 2009, p. 17).  Additional modifications and 
improvements of these forms will be required to enable enhanced information sharing 
and address future creations of new categories of sensitive information.10   The XML 
                                                 
10 The FBI restricted most of the detailed information regarding the new XML forms for Sentinel in 
the most recent DOJ-OIG report on Sentinel and has not officially released the forms within the FBI, which 





Segregation of Information approach is substantially more complex than the other 
approaches, which would require a more sophisticated computer system to accomplish its 
objectives.  This approach would provide an automated system for sharing the 
appropriate information actually available in the system, which would provide substantial 
future savings in personnel resources that are currently being utilized for the “ad hoc” 
manual information sharing methods.  Both technology approaches may have additional 
expenses associated with preparing the information for different systems or data sets for 
the different levels of classification or sensitivity.  For example, the FBI may need to 
create a different system to run on SIPRNET or HSDN to share classified information 
automatically, rather than manually.  These expenses would be less substantial than 
creating a whole new system, since the FBI could deploy the previously developed 
system on a new network.  The deployment of an existing system to a new network 
would only have the additional equipment and maintenance costs.  It is also possible to 
significantly mitigate the vast majority of new expenditures for developing, deploying 
and operating a new computer system by utilizing the existing N-DEx system with 
minimal modifications to accommodate the additional requirements and functions 
necessary for the Discoverability of Information or XML Segregation of Information 
approaches. 
All four approaches could be highly rated for the fiscal performance criteria with 
the utilization of an existing system like N-DEx; however, a conservative rating approach 
was utilized to differentiate the rating of these four approaches.  Table 15 reflects the 
ratings for these four approaches. 

















3. Utilization of Technology 
The “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” exception approaches 
have very limited utilization of technology.  The technology utilized in the existing and 
developing approaches was extensively detailed in Chapter IV, including computer 
systems like eGuardian, LEO, RISSNET and others that store unclassified information.  
However, none of these systems is currently being utilized to identify or communicate 
FBI terrorism and homeland security case related information to SLTs.  They do have 
some limited capacity to serve this function in the future.11   N-DEx and OneDOJ are 
systems currently under development, accessible through LEO, designed to share 
criminal intelligence that may also have incidental value as terrorism or homeland 
security information.   
The Discoverability of Information approach requires technology to allow SLTs 
to quickly and effectively conduct searches of an index of entities in available FBI 
documents in this “pointer system.”  The FBI could employ NER technology to create an 
index of existing FBI terrorism and homeland security information from the existing free-
form FBI case reporting documents.  However, this approach still relies on the same 
current manual or automated processes of sharing terrorism and homeland security 
information employed by the “status quo” and new homeland security “routine use” 
exception approaches.  Technology is a critical component of this Discoverability of 
Information approach, but there are vital aspects of this approach that still require FBI 
employees and TFOs to perform essential manual processes. 
The XML Segregation of Information approach requires the most extensive 
utilization of technology.  This approach uses XML technology to segregate the many 
different types of classified and sensitive information collected and maintained by the 
FBI.  The FBI already employs XML technology for several existing forms and the new 
forms being developed for Sentinel.  This approach will utilize technology to remove or 
anonymize different types of classified and sensitive information to comply with 
                                                 
11 eGuardian stores SAR information, which is also stored in the FBI case management systems and 




restrictions of the particular system or recipient.  This approach is dependent on advanced 
technologies to facilitate the searching and actual sharing of terrorism and homeland 
security information.  The XML Segregation of Information approach requires a 
sophisticated computer-network, like N-DEx, or multiple sophisticated computer systems 
to address the different classification levels of the information maintained in FBI case 
management systems, which would require at least a Secret and a Controlled Unclassified 
Information system.  
All four approaches are enhanced by technology; however, the difference in the 
role(s) of technology in these approaches resulted in the following ratings for the 
approaches (Table 16). 












Utilization of Technology  Low  Low  Medium  High 
 
4. Training Requirements 
The “status quo” approach has already been implemented with the required and 
supplemental training.  Additional training would improve FBI performance and 
compliance in the “status quo” approach, which is an ongoing requirement for all 
information sharing approaches.  The case of Major Hassan illustrates the need for 
improved training of FBI SAs, IAs and TFOs to enhance identification of information for 
sharing and compliance with the corresponding FBI policy and procedural requirements.  
The new homeland security “routine use” exception approach will require additional 
training for FBI personnel involved in this process to ensure their understanding of the 
enhanced scope of information that may be shared under the new policies and procedures.  
The FBI can leverage existing annual legal training sessions around the FBI, special 




accomplish this training.  The FBI regularly conducts training to ensure effective 
operations and compliance with FBI policy.  The FBI is capable of providing the 
necessary training for these approaches without any significant, additional burden or any 
new approaches. 
The Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches require much greater training.  These technological approaches will be able to 
use the same technologies already used by the FBI to train the FBI personnel; however, 
these technological approaches will also have to provide some level of training to the 
outside agency users of the system(s).  This type of training could be facilitated through 
the actual computer system deployed or mandated as a condition of gaining access to the 
system.  The requirement to train individuals all around the United States with the 18,000 
different law enforcement agencies and additional homeland security agencies will be an 
ongoing obligation for the FBI, which will require significant additional training 
resources on a continuing basis.  The Discoverability of Information approach is 
dependant on a search tool that would be familiar to regular users of computers, which 
minimizes some of the training requirements.  The training of system users is critical to 
ensure effective identification of the maximum amount of potentially relevant material, 
while limiting the amount of irrelevant material that could otherwise be erroneously 
identified as relevant.  Inadequate training could cause system users to fail to identify 
critical, relevant information and may create an enormous burden on the FBI, which 
would be forced to dedicate additional resources for the manual review and sharing 
processes.   
The XML Segregation of Information approach uses a more complicated system 
with a greater amount of information available.  Therefore, the users of this system are 
likely to need even greater training than users of the simpler Discoverability of 
Information system.  The XML Segregation of Information approach will also require the 
training of FBI personnel in the new XML forms designed and deployed with Sentinel for 
enhanced information sharing.  This training could be conducted through existing FBI 
training capabilities to ensure that the over 30,000 FBI employees and all the TFOs 




greatest vulnerability in this system is its dependence on the creator of the document to 
appropriately identify all classified and sensitive information.  The FBI collectors of 
information could withhold unclassified, non-sensitive information by inappropriately or 
erroneously identifying information as classified or sensitive to prevent its efficient 
disclosure outside the FBI through this system.  The most reliable method to minimize 
the potential negative consequences of both of these problems is enhanced training, 
which can be ensured through robust review and auditing by FBI management.  
The analysis of the training requirements and capabilities resulted in the following 
ratings for the four approaches (Table 17). 












Training Requirements  High  Medium  Medium  Low 
 
C. FINAL OVERALL NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to facilitate overall analysis of these approaches and compare their 
relative value, the ratings have been aggregated and converted into the numerical values 
described in Chapter III.  These tables provide the both effectiveness factors and criteria 
with numerical values and totals for all approaches.  Table 18 represents the ratings 
developed in the analysis in this chapter with a higher overall score representing a more 













Criteria  Rating  Pts  Rating  Pts  Rating  Pts  Rating  Pts 
Information 
Shared                         
Relevance  Medium  2  High  3  Medium  2  Medium  2 
Accuracy  Medium  2  High  3  Medium  2  High  3 
Timeliness  Low  1  Low  1  Medium  2  High  3 
Information 
Rating     5    7    6    8 
Privacy 
Protection                         
Public 
Perceptions  Medium  2  Unknown *  Unknown *  Unknown  * 




Low  1  Low  1  High  3  High  3 
Privacy 
Rating    5    
3 ‐ 
612    
5 ‐ 
812    
6 ‐ 
912 




Medium  2  Medium  2  Medium  2  High  3 
Access 
Control  Medium  2  Medium  2  High  3  High  3 
Compliance/ 
Audit  Medium  2  Medium  2  High  3  High  3 
Security 













                                                 





Analysis of the proposed approaches’ likely public perception is complicated by 
the inability to accurately predict public perception prior to the attempted implementation 
of any approach.  Therefore, variance analysis was used to determine the potential impact 
of public perception on the privacy protection effectiveness factor.  It is highly unlikely 
that a new or proposed system will achieve the level of performance or projected 
performance in protecting privacy required for a high public perception rating.  This high 
level of public confidence system performance on privacy protection is almost certainly 
going to require the system to perform at a high level for some period of time with 
appropriate review by a trusted entity or individual(s) to confirm enhanced performance.  
The variance analysis will consider all three possible ratings to determine the impact of 
all three on the privacy protection and overall ratings.  The minimum rating is low, which 
generates 1 point for the privacy protection evaluation factor and the overall effectiveness 
evaluation.  The rating for the “status quo” was maintained consistent throughout the 
variance analysis.  The potential impacts of all variations on the privacy protection results 



























This variance analysis demonstrates that the only option within an overall privacy 
protection rating lower than the “status quo” is the “low” rating for the homeland security 
“routine use” exception.  All other variations resulted in an overall privacy protection rating of 
equal to or greater than the “status quo” approach privacy protection rating.  This variance 








Low Public Perception Medium Public
Perception
High Public Perception
HLS "Routine Use" Exception Discoverability of Information
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Figure 5.   Variance Analysis for Impact of Public Perception Ratings on 
Overall Effectiveness Factor Ratings 
This overall variance analysis demonstrates that the potential variations of public 
perception cannot result in an overall rating below the “status quo.”  Furthermore, the 
highest overall rating for each approach is still below the lowest rating for the next 
approach, which confirms that the variation of this single criterion will not change the 
overall relationship between the ratings of all four approaches. 
The effectiveness and implementation rating scores for each of the approaches 
demonstrates they all have the potential to improve FBI terrorism and homeland security 
information sharing with SLT agencies. Although public perception has been a major 
obstacle to several high-profile homeland security related information initiatives, the 
variance analysis and overall evaluation demonstrate that the inability to effectively and 





The FBI is committed to sharing timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence to 
the widest appropriate audience. Effective information exchange with federal 
agencies; state, local, and tribal officials; foreign partners; and the private sector is 
an increasingly important component to the FBI’s unique and important national 
security and law enforcement mission. The FBI is required to effectively balance 
the need to effectively and securely share information with its responsibility to 
protect sources, investigative operations, national security information, and the 
privacy and civil liberties of US persons. (FBI, 2008, ¶ 2) 
—FBI National Information Sharing Strategy Vision Statement 
Since 9/11, the FBI has substantially improved information sharing.  However, 
this thesis demonstrates the potential for continued improvement of terrorism and 
homeland security information sharing with SLT homeland security agencies.   
A. OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACHES 
The two-phase analysis determined that all of the proposed approaches improve 
FBI information sharing over the “status quo.”  Although the implementation factor 
ratings varied for each of the approaches, the overall rating of implementation for all of 
the proposed approaches was the same.  Therefore, the primary focus should be on the 
effectiveness factors and criteria that represent the potential performance of each of these 
approaches.  Figure 6 illustrates the overall effectiveness performance for each of these 


















Figure 6.   Overall Effectiveness of Approaches 
The XML Segregation of Information outperformed all the other approaches by a 
significant measure due to its technological superiority to the other approaches.  In fact, 
the level of performance for XML Segregation of Information approach overcomes the 
complications created by the inability to predict public perception in this methodology, 
since it exceeds the 2-point margin of error created by this complication.  Despite the 
clear advantages of the two technological approaches, the FBI should still address the 
following questions to select the best approach for the FBI: 
1. How much information does the FBI want to share with SLT agencies? 
2. How effectively does the FBI want to share this information? 
1. How Much to Share? 
The FBI currently shares U.S. Person information covered by the Privacy Act 
when it relates to a violation of law, regulation, rule, order or contract.  The FBI can 
continue this level of information sharing with its possible confusion and inconsistency 
caused by individual employee interpretations of these restrictions, by taking no action to 
expand the current “routine use” exceptions.  This thesis created and analyzed a new 




relevant terrorism and homeland security information related to an investigation with 
some level of predication (i.e., suspicion or allegation of a terrorism threat). FBI 
Executive Management will first need to determine whether to continue utilizing the 
“status quo” or expanding the information shared with the new homeland security 
“routine use” exception.  This decision will be highly influenced by the public perception 
effectiveness criteria, which is impossible to accurately predict.  The FBI needs to decide 
if the public perception and any corresponding Congressional and Executive Branch 
response will prevent the successful implementation of an approach using the new 
homeland security “routine use” exception.  This new homeland security “routine use” 
exception was the only approach to receive a high rating for “relevant information 
shared” with SLT homeland security agencies.  The performance of the technological 
approaches on the two other criteria for information shared overcame this benefit in the 
overall analysis; however, it is a crucial criterion to re-consider in the final selection of 
approaches.  Figure 7 reflects the performance of all four approaches on the information 












Relevance Accuracy Timeliness  
Figure 7.   Information Shared Performance for All Approaches  
2. How to Share? 
Once the FBI determines the scope of the information to share, the next question 




agencies.  Phase one analysis of the two technological approaches clearly demonstrates 
the potential for the Discoverability of Information and XML Segregation of Information 
approaches to enhance the information shared, privacy protected and security over the 
current “status quo” manual methods of sharing regardless of the scope of the 
information shared in these systems.  These two approaches complement one another, 
since it is not feasible to effectively integrate the historical and classified information into 
the XML Segregation of Information approach.  The FBI needs to determine the extent of 
technology for expanded information sharing with SLT homeland security agencies.  The 
Discoverability of Information approach offers a simpler, cheaper technological 
approach, which unfortunately has a corresponding limitation in performance requiring 
manual sharing mechanisms.  The XML Segregation of Information approach is more 
complex and expensive with a corresponding increase in information sharing 
effectiveness.  The FBI needs to determine the level of expense and technology it can 
feasibly commit to implement enhanced information sharing. 
B. COMBINATION OF MULTIPLE APPROACHES 
All of the proposed approaches must effectively integrate the “status quo” 
approach, since it represents the current FBI foundation for all FBI information 
management and sharing.  The thesis methodology is effective for analyzing the 
combinations as a group, but not for comparing combinations with individual approaches.  
It provides an effective way to measure interactions if the scale were extended or if all 
approaches were evaluated on the same scale (e.g., some of the combined approach(es) 
would score high and the individual approaches less than high)  This potential to enhance 
the overall information sharing efforts of the FBI requires some consideration of the 
integration of these approaches. 
The new homeland security “routine use” exception allows greater terrorism and 
homeland security information sharing with SLTs.  Therefore, this approach would 
enhance the quantity and quality of terrorism and homeland security information shared 
through the two technological approaches.  Similarly the Discoverability of Information 




expansive and effective FBI terrorism and homeland security information sharing.  The 
Discoverability of Information approach would most effectively handle existing non-
XML, free-form FBI reporting documents, while the XML Segregation of Information 
would most effectively handle new FBI terrorism and homeland security information 
collected and reported in new XML reporting documents.   
The combination of multiple approaches could also enhance the negative aspects 
of each of the proposed approaches.  For example, the combination of multiple 
approaches could create a greater public concern over perceived privacy intrusions 
compared with deploying each approach individually.  However, the method and timing 
of the announcement and deployment of multiple systems could mitigate this negative 
impact or enhance the likelihood of successful implementation of the different 
approaches.  Assessing public perception of an individual approach was extremely 
complicated, but it is even more complicated to assess the likely public perception of 
combination approaches. 
There is potential for some mitigation of the implementation factors analyzed in 
phase two with combination systems.  The burden of an additional approach is likely to 
be less than the implementation of all approaches individually.  For example, the two 
technological approaches could be integrated into a single system, which should reduce 
cost, maximize utilization of technology and reduce training requirements.  Similarly, the 
combination of the new homeland security “routine use” exception with either or both of 
the technological approaches would not result in a significant additional burden from the 
three implementation factors.  The implementation factor that could be significantly 
complicated by combination approaches is the cultural barriers, since opposition to any of 
the approaches in a combination is likely to result in FBI cultural resistance to the entire 
system or approach.   
C. RECOMMENDATION 
The combination approaches could have a dramatic improvement in overall 
information sharing with SLT homeland security agencies.  The ideal approach would 




of information shared, privacy protected and security.  This approach ensures the 
broadest scope of information shared by utilizing the new homeland security “routine 
use” exception.  The FBI would need to publish the new homeland security “routine use” 
exception in the Federal Register with appropriate opportunity for comment by the public 
and OMB.  This combination approach would employ the Discoverability of Information 
approach to maximize the sharing of historical and classified information not suitable for 
the XML Segregation of Information approach.  Finally, the XML Segregation of 
Information approach offers the greatest flexibility for sharing information, protecting 
privacy and ensuring security for all new information collected by the FBI using the new 
XML forms to segregate the different types of sensitive and classified information. 
The FBI made significant progress with the creation of N-DEx for sharing 
criminal intelligence information between federal and SLT law enforcement agencies.  
This system will cost almost $250 million and could easily be utilized to share terrorism 
and homeland security information with federal and SLT agencies.  The recommended 
approach would utilize NER technologies to index the historical FBI information for a 
Discoverability of Information approach that could be integrated into N-DEx.  A 
comparable system should be created on DoD SIPRNET and DHS HSDN networks to 
enable the sharing of the classified information through an automated system with other 
federal entities and fusion centers with access to these classified networks. 
This recommended combination approach would ensure the greatest possible sharing 
of terrorism and homeland security information with SLT homeland security agencies.  The 
increased information sharing with SLT homeland security agencies could also easily be 
expanded to the other federal homeland security agencies by simply giving them their own 
access to the systems.  This recommended approach provides the greatest flexibility in 
implementation, since the FBI will achieve an information sharing improvement through the 
implementation of any single or combination of these approaches.  Therefore, if the FBI is 
unable to get the funding for a new XML Segregation of Information approach due to public 
perception and governmental reaction, there would still be a benefit from implementing the 




approaches.  The recommended approach also enables the FBI to expand information sharing 
in either a piecemeal or comprehensive implementation manner. 
D. THE FUTURE OF FBI INFORMATION SHARING 
The “status quo” clearly demonstrates a dramatic improvement in FBI 
information sharing in the 9 years of FBI transformation since the 9/11 attacks.  The FBI 
could continue these “ad hoc” approaches and wait for a federal government-wide 
solution, while dedicating resources to other ongoing transformation projects.  The FBI 
demonstrated its commitment to criminal information sharing with the creation and 
ongoing implementation of N-DEx and the pursuit of terrorism suspicious activity with 
the creation and implementation of eGuardian.  The FBI should expand this recent history 
of initiative taking by creating a system to significantly expand terrorism and homeland 
security information sharing with SLTs.  The impending deployments of Sentinel and N-
DEx have paved the way for this next step of fully integrating the SLT agencies into the 
overall homeland security effort.  Utilizing any individual or combination of the 
approaches proposed in this thesis would enable the FBI to more fully integrate the SLTs 
into the overall homeland security effort.  This would also clearly demonstrate FBI 
commitment to joint homeland security and counterterrorism efforts with SLTs, and its 















Figure 9.   FBI Electronic Communication (EC) (From FBI, n.d. (c))13 
                                                 
13 The FBI declassified this EC as a supporting document for the 9/11 Commission Final Report.  It is 
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